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REBALANCING LAW AND POLITICS IN
THE WTO: A CASE STUDY IN
SUBSIDIES NEGOTIATIONS
Ada Bogliolo Piancastelli Siqueira*
ABSTRACT
This paper attempts to link the activity of the Dispute Settlement Body of
the World Trade Organization (WTO) to its effects on the Doha Rounds
of negotiation and the increasing technicalization of WTO law. It will ar-
gue that the interpretative path chosen by the Dispute Settlement Body
(DSB) over the last decade has contributed to the stagnation of the trade
rounds by avoiding a re-discussion of the underlying purposes and goals of
the trading system whilst adding to the legal and technical complexity of
Rules Negotiations. In order to do so, this paper will test this hypothesis on
three subsidy disputes, Brazil-Aircraft, US-Cotton, and Australia-Leather
and their parallel effect on trade negotiations.
I. INTRODUCTION
HIS paper has one main underlying purpose. It will shed light onTthe increasing political scope in the twenty-first century of the
WTO's Dispute Settlement System (DSS). This proposal is of
timely importance for matters of international governance. In a context
of ten years of institutional deadlock in Rules Negotiations, much deci-
sion power now emanates in the form of DSS reports. This work empha-
sizes that there are institutional, systemic, and global effects associated
with this new configuration of the trading regime.
The politics of trade law making within the WTO will be thus
presented through a unique institutional and legal framework. This will
be one of the main innovative contributions of this thesis. It will demon-
strate how the legislative and adjudicative branches of this organization
have come to operate during the last decades through a very specific form
of legal reasoning. It will argue that the role played by law within the
WTO greatly influences its workings as well as its substantive effects. In
recognizing an increasing "relative judicial power"1 of the WTO's DSS in
the context of the Doha Deadlock, this thesis will suggest that the current
* Ada Bogliolo Piancastelli Siqueira is a S.J.D. Candidate at Georgetown University
Law Center.
1. TOMER BROUIDE, INTERNATIONAL GOVERNANCE IN TI-n WTO: JUDICIAL BOUND-
ARIES AND POLITICAL CAPITULATION 39 (2004).
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legal approaches to dispute resolution taken by the WTO's panels and
Appellate Bodies (ABs) have added to the system's stalemate. As will be
demonstrated, the DSS has favored methods of increased legal dexterity
in its solving of disputes that directly influence Rules Negotiations. It
provides a counter-perspective to the conventional welcoming of legaliza-
tion within the WTO since the GATT years.
Subsequently, the paper will proceed to demonstrate that the role that
law has played within the WTO's DSS has negatively influenced Rules
Negotiations and it is partially accountable for the organization's legiti-
macy dilemma. In placing such importance on the rule of law within the
trading system, this paper will be an attempt to reconnect policymakers
and negotiators to the substantive effects and ideational implications pro-
fessional language. Towards that purpose, this work is divided into sev-
eral parts.
Part I consists of this introduction. Part II will critically engage in a
constructivist view of the trading system as a means to understand the
extent, forms, and limits through which the role and ideas of this organi-
zation have been continuously redesigned. 2 To accomplish this, a com-
parative approach will focus on the role that law has played in each of
these ideational shifts. A third focus of the research will be institutional
explanations for this "judicial shift' 3 within the WTO. The paper will
attempt to demonstrate that the very nature of the WTO presupposes an
enmeshment of its legal and political organs, demonstrating that a mixed
political outcome has come from this "judicialization shift" at the WTO.
Second, the interaction between legislative and adjudicative organs at the
WTO has become ever more organic as DSS' disputes are increasingly
able to influence Rules Negotiation's agenda setting, clarification of rules,
and legal interpretation in certain issues. Part IV will review three differ-
ent subsidy cases in order to exemplify the implication that legal and in-
stitutional choices have for the trading regime.
Having made these three separate but interrelated arguments, this pa-
per will offer its conclusions on the different sort of attention that needs
to be directed to understanding the new modus operandi of the WTO.
As this thesis reviews, a simple yet innovative logic is in place at the
WTO. This new logic can be summarized in three cyclical phases. First, a
multipolarity of ideational perspectives has close to stagnated the work-
ings of the Rules Negotiations Group. For this reason, countries have be-
gun resorting to the DSS in search of understandings of trade law.
Second, and almost as a reflex, a formal language and legal processes that
allow for this diversity of interests to be argued under has been devel-
oped by the DSS. Thirdly, the procedural responses found by the panels
2. ANDREW LANG, WORLD TRADiE LAW AI-rER NIOLIBERALISM: RE-IMAGINING
THE GLO13AL ECONOMIC ORDER 349 (2011).
3. Judith L. Goldstein & Richard H. Steinberg, Regulatory Shift: The Rise of Judicial
Liberalization at the WTO 2-3 (UCLA Sch. of Law, Law & Econ. Research Paper
No. 07-15) available at http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract-id=102603
9##.
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and ABs have circularly contributed to the difficulties in trade law negoti-
ations. Procedural interpretation of WTO rules has attached significant
weight and an extended breath of meaning to each term in trade agree-
ments. There is an increased demand for technical and legal expertise,
enhancing negotiators' awareness of potential implications of every word,
gap, or ambiguity dueled on.
Lastly, this paper will argue that the stagnation of negotiations has al-
tered the organization's working dynamics, and, in consequence, new is-
sues have arisen. These new issues have been insufficiently addressed by
the literature despite their enormous political implications. It is in this
literature gap that this thesis fits and contributes. Uniquely, this paper
attaches great importance to the role of law within the WTO. It will link
DSS legal interpretations and rule negotiations to their direct conse-
quences for international trade governance. Innovatively, it will suggest
that the manner in which law is understood and interpreted within the
DSS exemplifies this intertwining of law and politics within the WTO.
Additionally, this paper will add to the existing literature by providing a
constructivist explanation of how the Doha Deadlocks has come to be
associated with the over-activity of the DSS and an emerging form of
judicial dispute resolution. It will also contribute, policy-wise, with the
realization that this shift towards the DSS is actually counter-productive
in terms of the system's sustainability. It has arrived at being a manner of
avoiding a re-discussion of the underlying purposes and goals of the trad-
ing system whilst adding to the legal and technical complexity of Rules
Negotiations.
II. THROUGH THE WINDOW OF A MOVING TRAIN:
IDEATIONAL SHIFTS IN THE GAT
AND WTO SYSTEM
Telling the "story" of modern international economic law is very much
like "describing a landscape while looking out the window of a moving
train," says J.H. Jackson. 4 "Events tend to move faster than one can de-
scribe them."'5 This part (and indeed, this paper) aims to demonstrate
how ideational shifts have shaped the GATT bargain throughout the
years and to provide insights as to how further challenges may be tackled.
It will consider that the common assumption that the world trade system,
evolved from a power-based (trade politics) regime to a rules-based
(trade law) regime 6 in a steady process of legalization, does not accu-
4. Sachet Singh & Sooraj Sharma, Investor-State Dispute Settlement Mechanism: The
Quest for Workable Roadmap, 29 UTRECI IT J. INT'L & CUR. L. 88, 89 (2013).
5. JOHN H. JACKSON ET AL., LEGAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC RE-
LATIONS: CASES, MA-IRIALS, AND TEXT ON TlE, NATrIONAL AND In-ERNATIONAL.
REGULATION OF TRANSNATIONAL ECONOMIC RELATIONS 15 (3rd ed. 1995).
6. J. John H. Jackson, The Crumbling Institutions of the Liberal Trade System, 12 J.
WORLD TRADE 93, 93-99 (1978).
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rately represent the reality of this regime. 7 This part will first draw upon
Andrew Lang's sociological construct of the history of the GATT, identi-
fying the era of embedded liberalism and purposive law, the legal and
technical shift of a "neoliberal consensus," and finally, the post-neoliberal
ideational change of the post-WTO years. This overview will be accom-
panied by basic systemic and material explanations of the changes that
have occurred. In doing so, this part will outline the role that law has
played in these changes. Concomitantly and lastly, it will present the legal
choice associated with each of these ideational shifts as institutional
choices made within the WTO.
The ideational narrative of the trading system, for the purposes of this
paper, commences with the end of the classical liberal era and with the
coming into being of the so-called modern public economic law. 8 This
was marked by two divergent worldviews that greatly politicized world
economy.9 On one side of the Atlantic, Cordell Hull, the U.S. Secretary
of State, was fighting against widespread protectionism, beggar-thy-
neighbor policies such as the Smoot-Hawley Tariff Act of 1930, exchange
control devaluations, and nationalization of foreign property. 10 He pro-
fessed his belief that peace and welfare of nations were connected to the
maximum practicable degree of freedom in international trade.1 ' On the
other, the British were taking this logic a step further and designing mul-
tilateral systems of economic governance.12 The works of Meade and
Keynes heralded this approach during the late thirties and early forties.
Respectively, they envisaged a multilateral Commercial Union for trade
to stabilize world demand through buffer shocks of primary products13
and an International Clearing Union to structure the post-war financial
system, addressing the depression as mostly a problem of free market
instability and persistent unemployment.' 4
Only after World War II was common ground found between Ameri-
cans and the British. Both understood that the war had profoundly
scarred every aspect of international relations and law, and that the draft-
ing of a new framework was urgent to avoid repetition of the worst of
7. Judith Goldstein, Miles Kahler, Robert 0. Keohane, & Anne-Marie Slaughter, Le-
galization and World Politics, 54 INT'L ORG. 385, 389 (Summer 2000) (referring to
a victory for trade legalists over trade pragmatists); See also Richard H. Steinberg,
In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-Based Bargaining and Outcomes in
the GATT/WTO, 56 INT'L ORG. 339, 339-374 (2002).
8. ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, CONSTITUTIONAL FUNCTIONS AND CONSTITU-
TIONAL PROBLEMS OF INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 33 (1991).
9. LANG, supra note 2, at 190.
10. CORDEU. HULL & HAMILTON Fisii ARMSTRONG, ECONOMIC BARRIERS 10 PEACE
6 (1937).
11. Id. at 13-14.
12. Id. at 6-7.
13. Martin Dauton, A Tale of Two Conferences-The International Trade Organiza-
tion, GATT and World Trade, in Is FREE TRAi)E FAIR TRADE: NEw PERSPEC-
TIVES ON -ME WORLD TRADING SYS-1-1M 37 (Frank Trentmann ed., 2009).
14. KARL POLANYI, TIlE GREAT TRANSFORMATION 194 (1944).
REBA LANCING LAW AND POLITICS
inter-war years.15 In this perception, U.S. bilateral negotiations wit-
nessed a seminal shift towards multilateralism and embrace of the British
perspective. 16 This shift is referred to as the "embedded liberalism com-
promise."17 Whilst there is vast literature on the convergences and diver-
gences of this bargain, 18 it may be summarized that there was a shared
understanding that multilateral regimes of international law should be re-
designed as forums for negotiations and as guardians of international
rules.19 As Slaughter puts it, the regimes of the post-war period, GATT
included, were intended to internationally project organizing principles of
political power, characteristic of the welfare state of the period. 20 Ideally,
they would form a tripod of shared democracy, international law, and
economic interdependence as a means to establish enduring post-war
peace.2 1
This thin overlap of a normative consensus embodied in the GATT
would thus define the role that law was to play in this new regime.2 2 Like
divergences in the ideas and role of the GATT, its architects also di-
verged regarding the role law should play. The United States was in-
clined to install a formal and enforceable complaints procedure, based on
spelled-out and precise legal obligations. The United Kingdom favored
less emphasis on formally binding obligations. They understood legal am-
biguities as a constructive force of the system and a more operational
form of dispute mechanism.2 3 As Hudec explains, "[t]he point was not to
clutter economic experts in legalistic rituals, but rather to create a dispute
settlement animated by negotiations and compromise. '2 4
Some argue that the GATIT was better understood as a contract be-
tween these two sets of interests and players.2 5 All cases during the first
few years of the GATT had to make "face-to-face negotiation with the
community value structure. '26 Results were established gradually and as
15. See Gerard Curzon & Victoria Curzon, The Management of Trade Relations in the
GATT, in INTERNATIONAi.. ECONOMIC RELATIONS O" THE WESTERN WOItLD:
1959-1971 141 (1976).
16. James N. Miller, Bard College, Paper Presented to the 25th Meeting of the Eastern
Economics Association: The Pursuit of a Talking Shop: Political Origins of Ameri-
can Multilateralism 1934-1945 (Mar. 1999).
17. John Gerald Ruggie, International Regimes, Transactions, and Change: Embedded
liberalism in the Postwar Economic Order, 36 INr'L Oiwi. 379, 393 (1982).
18. See G. John lkenberry, A World Economy Restored: Expert Consensus and the
Anglo-American Postwar Settlement, 46 IN'!'L ORG. 289, 294-95 (1992).
19. See ANDREAS F. LOWENFELD, INTFERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 24 (2002).
20. Anne-Marie Slaughter, Regulating the World: Multilateralism, International Law,
and the Projection of the New Deal Regulatory State, in MULTILATERALISM MAT-
TERS, 125, 125 (John Gerald Ruggie ed., 1993).
21. See Bruce Russett, A Neo-Kantian Perspective: Democracy, Interdependence, and
International Organization in Building Security Communities, in SFcurl'FY COM-
MUNIrIES 368 (Emanuel Adler & Michael Barnett eds., 1998).
22. LANG, supra note 2, at 199.
23. Id. at 200.
24. Robert E. Hudec, The GATT Legal System: A Diplomat's Jurisprudence, 4 J.
Wom-ro TRAm7E L. 618 (1970).
25. JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE LAW AND TIE LAW OF GATF 12 (1969).
26. Hudec, supra note 24, at 203.
2014]
214 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 20
cautiously as they emanated from the self-given authority placed upon
the decision bodies. This led to a malfunctioning DSS that could not oper-
ate without full cooperation of the respective party states. This format of
the DSS had a limited scope of action, interpretation, and decision-mak-
ing. Although GATT dispute settlement had its moments of success, un-
til 1958 it was far from being an established independent authority.27
The GATT legal system inclined towards the British-favored approach
of legal ambiguity as a constructive force and instrument enabling the
broader purposes of the system to take place. Constructive ambiguities
were more than pragmatic concessions amongst states; they were the
agreed legal format engendering effective and operational dispute settle-
ments.28 The overarching purpose of dispute settlement at that stage was
to rebalance expectations and create a forum for amicable resolutions of
controversies-an "unwritten credo" of maintaining a balance in interna-
tional trade transactions.29 On a more concrete level, it was a "messy,
multifaceted legal system solution"30 that embodied a legal "purposive"
approach to the role of law.
A. TOKYO AND THE FORMAL-TECHNICAL TURN
The Tokyo Round of negotiations (1973-1979) is the second key mo-
ment of relevant analysis in GATT's history. It offered the first set of
attempts to combat the "diplomatic jurisprudence" quality that the sys-
tem had acquired throughout its first thirty years. Although some argue
that this was not such a decisive moment,3 1 this paper sides with Hudec in
that, prior to the 1970s, the GATT was dominated by an anti-legal culture
that only began to melt away in the late 1960s, not completely collapsing
until the early 1980s.32 The end of this anti-legalistic culture was closely
related to a new ideational shift reflecting new states' priorities and inter-
national configurations. The "embedded liberalism compromise" began
to falter and the GATT was seen as a forum for controversies and an
unclear framework for the trading system. This shift regarding the pur-
pose of the trading system transformed the many levels of the GATT
bargain.
There are contextual reasons for this ideational shift. There was eco-
nomic turmoil in many Western economies and significant change in the
international commercial circumstances. The European Community, es-
tablished in 1958, accounted for a higher percentage of world trade than
27. Id. at 205.
28. LANG, supra note 2, at 201.
29. Curzon & Curzon, supra note 15, at 321.
30. Robert Howse, From Politics to Technocracy-And Back Again: The Fate of the
Multilateral Trading Regime, 96 AM. J. INT'L L. 94, 96 (2002).
31. Jacob Viner, Conflicts of Principle in Drafting a Trade Charter, 25 FOREIGN AFr.
615 (1947).
32. Robert Hudec, The Judicialization of GATT Dispute Settlement, in WIIOSE IN-rR-
EST?: DUE PROCESS AND TRANSPARENCY IN INTERNATIONAL TRADE, 9-43
(Michael M. Hart & Debra P. Steger eds., 1992).
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did the United States.33 Former wartime opponents, Germany and Japan,
as well as other newly industrialized nations, were no longer willing to
import inflation associated with the rise in North American expenditure
and lack of increase in domestic taxation. In 1971, in the midst of a de-
cline in its competitiveness and an increase in international barriers to its
knowledge-intensive industries and services, the United States faced its
first trade deficit in over a decade.34 Concurrently, the par value Bretton
Woods' system of exchange rates ended with the aggravated economic
shocks associated with the 1970s oil crisis.
This international context prompted one prevailing ideational reac-
tion.35 The barriers the United States faced worldwide gave rise to do-
mestic sentiments of unfairness in international trade. Legislation was
passed demanding strict reciprocity and the "principle supplier" rule in
goods of particular interest to the United States in trade negotiations. 36
The sentiment of unfairness in international trade was also present in in-
ternational trade litigation in the GATT. Throughout the 1950s and
1960s, GATT's dispute settlement had become a focus for Contracting
Parties' "hypersensitivities. '' 37 There were doubts about reciprocity and
fairness of procedures. Retaliation in famous disputes such as "The
Chicken War" and the "Uruguayan Recourses to Article XXIII" had not
been successful and the number of GATT procedures continuously de-
clined until the end of the decade.38 The "embedded liberalism bargain
[was] under stress" 39 and a new shift was under way. Neoliberalism 40 was
echoed enthusiastically not as mere free trade, but rather as the basic
economic objective of the system and as a promoter of general welfare to
all nations.
On that account, new legal demands followed GATT's neoliberal shift.
Tokyo was marked by a shift from focus on tariff barriers to "non-tariff"
barriers to trade. Whereas barriers to trade had been initially identified
according to the governmental protectionist intention behind them, now
33. GILBERT R. WINHAM, INTERNATIONAL TRADE AND THE' TOKYO RoUND NEGOTI-
ATION, 28 (1986).
34. LANG, supra note 2, at 224.
35. Id. at 228.
36. JACKSON, supra note 25, at 243.
37. ROBERT HuiEc, Tii GATT LEGAL SYSTEM AND WORLD TRADF DIPLOMACY,
242 (2d. ed. 1990).
38. See id. 242-43.
39. Robert Howse & Kalypso Nicolaidis, Enhancing WTO Legitimacy: Constitutional-
ization or Global Subsidiary?, in DELIBERATEL-Y DEMOCRATIZING MUJ'rILAT'-
ERAL ORGANIZATION 73, 77 (Marco Verweij & Tim Josling eds., 2003).
40. The definition of neoliberalism, however, is "hydra-headed," suggests Andrew
Gamble. The term has constantly evolved and adapted itself since its creation in
the 1970's. Crucially, for the purpose of this paper, neoliberalism will be under-
stood as a political turn from communal goals and collective purposes of a group of
actors. Economically, it will refer to a normative preference to free market and
free trade in the pursuit of individuals' private goals and interests. In political
economy, it will represent a critique of Keynesianism and a shift towards practical
politics, both in the national politics of particular states and in the international
agencies of the global order. Andrew Gamble, Neo-Liberalism, 75 CAPITAL AN!)
CLASS 127, 128-34 (2001).
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what mattered was the economic effect deriving from such a governmen-
tal act.4 1 This change allowed for a much broader interpretation of what
constituted a barrier to trade. As the liberalization ethos became the
mainspring of the work of trade diplomats and negotiators, a concomitant
change was seen in their interpretational bias, styles, and techniques. 42
Gradually, different institutional forms of domestic regulations were
questioned at the GATT level.43 Towards this purpose, GATT's articles I
and III had their scope expanded to reflect the underlying understanding
that free markets should be the primary strategy for growth and prosper-
ity. It was the shift from embedded liberalism to neoliberal consensus.
Lang argues that the trading regime re-imagined itself as a "political mar-
ketplace" and "market access" 44 became the coin of exchange in the new
format of the GATT regime. This neoliberal approach characterized the
last three decades of the twentieth century and drastically modified the
regime's legal order.
This shifting logic was accompanied by significant legal developments
during the Tokyo Round.45 There was a proliferation of GATT treaties
and an expansion of their regulatory scopes. During the 1970s, dispute
settlement panels were assisted by a new legal section of the GATT Sec-
retariat. GATT panels began to write longer reports, more precise and
legally reasoned. 46 In 1976, a Framework Group, first established during
the Tokyo Rounds, attempted to describe the practices taking place for
three decades without any written guidance. 47 Finally, in 1981, the GATT
established an Office for Legal Affairs to elaborate an Analytical Index
to make GATT law and practice more transparent. 48
The Uruguay Rounds (1986-1994) and the creation of the WTO repre-
sented the consolidation of this legalistic tendency. A compulsory and
automated DSM with enforceable sanctions was established. 49 Whereas
in times of embedded liberalism contracting parties would have a veto
power in all stages of the dispute settlement process, the Uruguay Round
discouraged disagreement through the adoption of the reverse consensus
41. LANG, supra note 2, at 224.
42. Id. at 159.
43. W.J. Drake & K. Nicolaidis, Ideas, Interests, and Institutionalization: "Trade in Ser-
vices" and the Uruguay Round, 46 INT'L ORG. 37, 40 (1992).
44. LANG, supra note 2, at 228.
45. For a timeline of progressive legalisation and codification of GATT/DSU see
ERNST-ULRICH PETERSMANN, THE GATr/WTO DisiuE SElI1-LEMFNT SYSTEM
1948-1995 84-87 (1998).
46. John H. Jackson, The World Trade Organisation: Watershed Innovation or Cau-
tious Small Step Forward?, 18 WORLD ECON. 25 (1995).
47. FAO Corporate Document Repository, The Status of Trade Preferences in the
WTO (2002), http://www.fao.org/docrep/004/y2732E/y2732eO8.htm.
48. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, GA TT Analytical Index: Notes on the Drafting, Interpre-
tation, and Application of the Articles of the General Agreement, GATI' 850 (loose-
leaf edition, 1985)
49. Rachel Brewster, The Remedy Gap: Institutional Design, Retaliation, and Trade
Enforcement, 80 GEo. WASi!. L. Ri~v. 102, 108-09 (2011).
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rule.50 A "power play"51 by the United States and the European Com-
mission, the world's two largest markets, was named "the single under-
taking" and guaranteed that all countries accepted all of the WTO
multilateral agreements-including the Agreement on Trade-Related In-
tellectual Property Rights (TRIPs), the General Agreement on Trade in
Services (GATS), the Understanding on Balance-of-Payments Provisions
of the GATT 1994, and other agreements, which most developing coun-
tries had previously refused to accept.5 2
At this point, justifications for a "rules-based" regime defended that
the trading system should serve mainly as a free trade facilitator for gov-
ernments and private business.5 3 This neoliberal concept of law emerged
as "a limit on the state. ' 54 Its operation became less about fulfilling
shared purposes and more about creating a forum for the pursuit of indi-
vidual economic interests against arbitrary behavior by public powers.55
In this sense, whilst the entanglement of diplomacy and DSS had been
coherent with a purposive approach to trade law, this was no longer ac-
ceptable with the shift to legalism. It was no longer adequate to analyze
the legitimacy of a trade measure according to perceptions of a trade elite
or a diplomatic ethos. The DSS was expected to draw upon legal and
"apolitical" standards to identify barriers to trade.
It was an attempt to separate law from politics within the WTO and
frame the trading system as a neutral regime with the goal of liberaliza-
tion of markets. Soon, WTO legal formalism walked hand-in-hand with
technical expertise in diverse areas of trade. The elaboration of domestic
regulations under the standards of trade law was to be measured against
specific borrowing from technical discourses, fertile in the area of food
safety, health standards, and technical barriers. Law became a gate-
keeper,5 6 crystallizing trade law as an apolitical, technical standard upon
which free trade as a common goal was to be pursued.
B. THE TWENTY-FIRST CENTURY'S POST-NEOLIBERALISM
AND PROCEss-BASED REVIEWS
The WTO's last decade, and the main focus of this work, has been a
period of fast rise of "non-trade" concerns in trade matters within the
WTO. The notion of trade liberalization, as consistent with regulatory
diversity and as capable of "accommodating a full range of non-economic
50. Id. at 113 n. 42.
51. Goldstein & Steinberg, supra note 3, at 8.
52. See generally Richard H. Steinberg, In the Shadow of Law or Power? Consensus-
Based Bargaining and Outcomes in the GA TT/WTO, 56 INT'L ORG. 339 (2002).
53. John H. Jackson, The Birth of the GA TT-MTN System: A Constitutional Appraisal,
12 LAW & Poi'y IN-r'i- Bus. 25 (1980).
54. David Kennedy, The "Rule of Law," Political Choices, and Development Common
Sense, in THE NiEw LAW AND ECONOMIC DEVELOPMENT: A CRITICAL APPRAISAl.,
95, 138 (D.M. Trubek & A. Santos eds., 2006).
55. Id.
56. LANG, supra note 2 at 310.
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public values," began to be questioned.57 The quest for global standards
in trade for labor, environment, and social goals responded to the "race-
to-the-bottom" that characterized developing countries in economic re-
covery from the diverse 1980s' debt crisis. Pressure arose from a range of
external constituencies concerned with specific political issues as well as
countries' generalized concerns over the intrusiveness of WTO law on
domestic regulatory autonomy. The 1980s and 1990s saw the emergence
of cases touching upon the jurisdictional limit of the WTO and the ques-
tioning of the "'dis-embedded' character of the international liberal or-
der."' 58 Fears alternated between a lack of international minimal
standards to the imposition of foreign standards and "the sustainability of
the domestic social contract under conditions of globalization. '59
These were disputes in which free trade was balanced against members'
regulatory interests, leading to a diversified set of AB decisions.
US-Gasoline,60  EC-Hormones,61 Brazil-Tyres,62 EC-Tariff Prefer-
ences,63  US-Shrimp,64  EC-Asbestos,65  China-Audiovisuals66  and
EC-Biotech67 further turned attention to this new tension in trade polit-
ics. Preoccupation emerged as to the WTO's role in reaching an accept-
able equilibrium between the pursuit of liberalized trade and the
fulfillment of other social goals. To Petersmann, this task was especially
tricky due to conflicting visions within the regime. Trade diplomats con-
tinued to perceive the WTO as a separate trade regime that should re-
main focused on national interests and on promotion of economic
development through trade liberalization and trade regulation. 68 Mean-
while, WTO jurisprudence and dispute settlement showed signs of acting
as an objective assessor of the common intentions of all 153 WTO mem-
bers as well as of WTO law and of broader international legal obliga-
57. Howse & Nicolaidis, supra note 39, at 8.
58. Id. at 9.
59. Id.
60. Appellate Body Report, United States-Standards for Reformulated and Conven-
tional Gasoline, WT/DS2/AB/R (Apr. 29. 1996) [hereinafter US-Gasoline].
61. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Concerning Meat and
Meat Products, WT/DS26/AB/R (Jan. 16, 1998) [hereinafter EC-Hormones].
62. Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Measures Affecting Imports of Retreaded Tyres,
WT/DS332/R (Jun. 12, 2007) [hereinafter Brazil-Tyres].
63. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Conditions for the Granting of
Tariff Preferences to Developing Countries, WT/DS246/AB/R (Apr. 7, 2004) [here-
inafter EC-Tariff Preferences].
64. Appellate Body Report, United States-Import Prohibition of Certain Shrimp and
Shrimp Products, WT/DS58/AB/R (Oct. 12, 1998) [hereinafter US-Shrimp].
65. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Measures Affecting the Prohibi-
tion of Asbestos and Asbestos Products, WT/DS135/AB/R (Mar. 12, 2001) [herein-
after EC-Asbestos Cases].
66. Appellate Body Report, China-Measures Affecting Trading Rights and Distribu-
tion Services for Certain Publications and Audiovisual Entertainment Products,
WT/DS363/AB/R (Dec. 21, 2009) [hereinafter China-Audiovisuals].
67. Appellate Body Report, European Communities-Approval and Marketing of Bi-
otech Products, WT/DS291/R, WT/DS292/R, WT/DS293/R (Nov. 21, 2006) [here-
inafter EC-Biotech].
68. PEERSMANN, supra note 9, at 2.
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tions.69 Also, a cosmopolitan civil society began to gain a stronger voice
and participation in trade matters. Petersmann points out that there were
growing critiques voiced by NGOs regarding the legitimacy of power-ori-
ented, producer-driven economic regulation.70 A rapid expansion of
world trade during the last decade of the twentieth century made explicit
the linkages between the WTO's liberalizing bias and its influence in
other areas of national and domestic life. The growing debate centered
on whether trade law would be able to master the appropriate regulatory
flexibility for WTO members. The legal and technical body of legislation
developed during the previous thirty years began to have its purposes
questioned, although the complex set of trade regulations remained sol-
idly established.
This had a novel and aggravating context. The aftermath of the Uru-
guay Round up to the Doha Round has been a period marked by com-
plex changes in the world economy with consequent reflections on the
WTO. Multipolarity entrenched the configuration of deadlocks. 7' New
actors became primordial in the trading system; India, China, and Brazil
became crucial in decision making procedures. Green room meetings,
although expanded, no longer held any decisive power. Rule-making
power was wholly shifted to multilateral member negotiations by means
of the consensus rule. Increased legitimacy of the negotiating process was
developed at the cost of decreased efficiency.72 A new Single Undertak-
ing was ambitiously drafted to seek a unanimous compromise in over
twenty-six different issue areas in international trade.
Increased multilateralism in the WTO caused not only difficulties in
negotiations but also characterized an ideational shift marked by a plural-
ity of ideas under one legal framework. Current analysis seems to suggest
that this new ideational shift is pushing for a deconstruction of the previ-
ous neoliberal mentality. It points towards a re-balancing of adequate
respect for the liberalization ethos and an equivalent respect of members'
internal regulations. Such re-imagination seems to be increasingly visible
on a case-by-case analysis by a socially and politically sensitive DSS. For
example, the economies of developing countries meant that agricultural
protection and access were now central. The G-20 negotiating group in-
augurated the motto: "Agriculture is the engine of the Round." Focus on
a "Development Round" and agreement to "less-than-full reciprocity"
created expectation among developing countries that concessions needed
to be asymmetrical.7 3 Ten years on, developed country domestic politics
69. Ernst-Ulrich Petersmann, Ten Years of the WTO Dispute Settlement System: Past,
Present, and Future, 3 J. INT'l L. POL'Y 1, 2 (2005).
70. See generally Peter Sutherland et al., REFORMING THE WORLD TRADE SYSTPM:
LEGITIMACY, EFFICIENCY, AND DiMOCRATIC GOVERNANCE (Ernst-Ulrich
Petersmann & James Harrison eds., 2008).
71. See Amrita Narlikar, New Powers in the Club: The Challenges of Global Trade
Governance, 86 INT'i AFR. 717, 717-28 (2010).
72. See id.
73. JAGDISII BHLAGWATI & PETER SUTHERLAND, THE DOHIA ROUND: SEIFING A
DEADLINE, DjVFINNG A FINAL DEAL 7 (2011); PAUL BLUSn-IN, THE MISADVEN-
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also changed. The United States, in particular, now claims full reciproc-
ity-at least from the largest developing countries-to sell the deal at
home.74
What is characteristic of the current trade politics dynamics, therefore,
is that the initial neoliberal political agreement has disappeared and no
further agreement has yet filled the vacuum. There is unsureness as to
what will follow. In this sense, when resorting to the adjudicative bodies,
states are not only seeking a particular interpretation of relevant WTO
provisions. They are also asking them to choose the political and social
vision of liberalized trade that should infuse and orient the trading re-
gime. Notably, the DSS has become a space to re-discuss and to contest
the purpose of trade barriers in the turn of the century. The conciliation
between substantive regulatory choices by members in pursuing "non-
trade" goals and the definition of the concept of "legitimate barriers to
trade" became the main challenge of the GATT/WTO legal system. A
debate that is most commonly framed as the "trade and" or "linkages"
debate (trade and environment, trade and development, human rights,
labor, and so forth) 75 turned into a central matter in the trading system.
Trade professionals struggle to find ways to enmesh these diverse regimes
in the trading regime as a response to global concerns. 76 The "trade and"
debates not only became the focus of vast academic literature on the
WTO but also readily influenced its institutional workings.
The search for a "social pact" or a legal framework that would respond
to the disquietudes of the trading system in the twenty-first century is the
third moment of legal analysis of GATTIWTO law. With the turn of the
century, most trade professionals became aware of the contentious
grounds upon which the multilateral trading system rests. As Dunoff
puts it, they are aware that the "fundamentals" of the system are "up for
grabs. '77 While the "neoliberal consensus" still accounts for a large part
TURES OF IH Mosr FAVOURED NATIONS: CLASIIiNG EGOS, INFLATDI) AMBI-
TIONS, AND THE SHAMBILES OF "1--I WORu TRADING SYSTEM (2009).
74. US Ambassador Punke stated: "In the past and again today, I have heard some say
that the U.S. approach needs to be more 'realistic' in its expectations for the
Round. But we hold a different perspective on realism in Doha. What is not real-
istic is the notion that a few of the world's most powerful trading nations can play
by a set of rules that gives them largely unfettered access to global mar-
kets-without giving appropriate reciprocity in return. That is not the basis for a
sustainable trading system. And it cannot be the outcome of this Round." State-
ment by Ambassador Michael Punke to the Trade Negotiations Committee, OFF.
U.S. TRADiF REPRESENTATIV (Nov. 30, 2010), http://www.ustr.gov/about-us/
press-office/press-releases/statement-ambassador-michael-punke-trade-negotia
tions-committee.
75. Andrew T.F. Lang, Reflecting on 'Linkage': Cognitive and Institutional Change in
the International Trading System, 70 MOD. L. RE-v. 523, 524-525 (2007).
76. See generally PE-TER SUTHERLAND ET AL., THE FuTURIz OF nn, WTO: ADDRESS-
ING INSTITUTIONAL CIIALLENGFS IN 'Tiii Niw MILLENNIUM (2004) (Report of the
Consultative Board); Joost Pauwelyn, The Sutherland Report: A Missed Opportu-
nity for Genuine Debate on Trade, Globalization, and Reforming of the WTO, 8 J.
INT'L ECON. L. 329 (2005).
77. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Death of the Trade Regime, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 733, 755
(1999).
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of legal work in the trading system, there is an emerging trend developing
as a result of the WTO's legitimacy crisis of the late 1990s. 7 8 An ade-
quate response to the situation needs to address value-sensitive areas
touched by trade regulation while upholding the importance of a regu-
lated and enforceable trading system. In noting that the AB seems not
yet to have yet settled on a single coherent approach, Lang recognizes a
few legal turns that have been taken to face this dilemma. Amongst
"deferentialism, cautious formalism and judicial minimalism '' 79 a
majoritarily "procedural approach" appears to have prevailed.80
There are distinct features involved with the notion of law and process-
based review within the WTO dispute settlement system. First, it signals
that the panels and AB have gained more political space for deliberating
on the legal method they wish to pursue in each specific dispute. But
there are also signs of a lacking interpretational and application frame-
work for the DSS to follow. This lack of direction or underlying social
purpose has serious implications for impacts and consequences of the
DSS activities. Also, it greatly influences perceptions and activities of
Rule Negotiations, as the following parts will endeavor to demonstrate.
This is a normative challenge due to novelty of its practice and content.
Some have understood, for instance, the practice of proceduralism to
mean the use of jurisprudential techniques to do justice to the delicate
interrelationship of values and interests.8 ' Others suggest that it is better
explained by what it denies. Being centered on the idea of deference, it
primarily aims to ensure that WTO law does not intrude on the regula-
tory prerogative of states.8 2 Practically, the idea of deference to states
also revolves around the tendency of proceduralization of claims rather
than on analysis of the measure. Bogdandy argues that this approach is
instrumental in the sense that it coordinates different regulatory systems,
and forces members to take into account the economic interest of others
when designing their own domestic regulatory frameworks.8 3
To facilitate comprehension of this new logic of legal reasoning, a
closer look at the United States-Shrimp decision is particularly helpful.
On a very basic level, the dispute centered on a complaint placed by
Asian States regarding provision section 609(b)(1) of U.S. Public Law
101-169, prohibiting the importation of foreign shrimp that had been har-
78. LANG, supra note 2, at 343.
79. Id. at 338.
80. Gregory Shaffer, A Structural Theory of WTO Dispute Settlement: Why Institu-
tional Choice Lies at the Center of the GMO Case, 41 N.Y.U. J. INT'L L. & PoL-. 1,
61 (2008).
81. Robert Howse, Adjudicative Legitimacy and Treaty Interpretation in International
Trade Law: The Early Years of WTO Jurisprudence, in Ttm, EU, TH1E WTO AND
THE NAFTA: TOWARDS A COMMON LAW OF INTERNATIONAL TRADE 35 (2000).
82. LANG, supra note 2, at 343.
83. A.V. Bogdandy, 'Legitimacy of International Economic Governance: Interpreta-
tive Approaches to WTO law and the Prospects of its Proceduralisation' in S.
Griller (Ed.), International Economic Governance and Non-economic Concerns,
Springer-Verlag, Vienna, 2003, p. 121.
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vested with technology that could adversely affect the relevant species of
sea turtles. 84 Central to the findings of the issue was the applicability and
interpretation of article XX exceptions by the AB. 85 The applicability of
article XX translated balancing environmental concerns on the one hand,
and trading obligations on the other.86 Thus, the AB had an explicit sub-
stantive choice in its lap. Instead of rising to the challenge, the AB chose
a legal path of proceduralism. 87 It employed a two-fold approach that
would repeat itself in most process-based reviews. 88 Initially, it over-
looked the substantive review of the matter and directly turned to a hy-
pothetical analysis of the requirements of an article XX justification. 89
By turning around the issue in this way, the AB avoided passing judg-
ment on substantive matters relating to the U.S. regulation and dismissed
the case on procedural requirements inherent in the chapeau of article
XX and in the concept of unjustifiable and arbitrary discrimination.90
More precisely, the AB found that the United States had applied the
measures in a "rigid" and "unbending" manner 9' and had failed to re-
spect the principles of "basic fairness and due process" owed to its trad-
ing partners in the design and application of the certification process. 92
Also, it found that the certification processes carried out by U.S. officials
were "singularly informal and casual."' 93 In light of such, it can be under-
stood that the AB's interpretation of article XX and consequent imposi-
tion of stringent preconditions on member governments greatly shapes
and limits the role of this provision.94
This turn has substantively affected trade politics. Initially, the focus
on legal and administrative procedures has worked to deviate attention
from broader questions about the underlying motives and roles of the
trading system. 95 Legalization of the trading regime is in itself a political
choice.96 Jens Ladefoged Mortensen argues that it is a reflection of rules
and procedures of dominant actors of the multilateral trade regime, thus
84. US-Shrimp, supra note 64; Department of Commerce, Justice and State, the Judi-
ciary, and Related Agencies Appropriations Act, 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-162,
§ 603(b)(1), 103 Stat 988 (1989).
85. See US-Shrimp, supra note 64.
86. Id. para. 12.
87. See generally id.
88. See id.
89. See id.
90. See id. paras. 161-86.
91. Id. paras. 163, 177.
92. Id. para. 181.
93. Id.
94. See Gisele Kapterian, A Critique of the WTO Jurisprudence on 'Necessity', 59 INT',
& CoMe. L.Q. 95 (2010). As to earlier critiques of article XX jurisprudence, see
Sanford Gaines, The WTO's Reading of the GA TT Article XX Chapeau: A Dis-
guised Restriction on Environmental Measures, 22 U. PA. J. INT'l ECON. L. 739
(2001).
95. See LANG, supra note 2, at 344.
96. Jens Ladefoged Mortensen, The Institutional Requirements of the WTO in an Era
of Globalisation: Imperfections in the Global Economic Polity, 6 EUR. L. J. 176,
188 (2000).
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constituting evitable political choices. 97 Accordingly, this shift to
"proceduralism" is by no means solely a legal development. It is also a
broader and deliberate "institutional choice" 98 shaped by perceptions of
the role of the DSS within the WTO. It is a choice not to act as decision-
maker in the political dispute regarding "liberalized trade" that should
infuse the present trading regime. It is, instead, a choice to defer to na-
tional decision-making bodies on substantive matters and to manage and
review domestic regulatory procedures at the WTO level.99
This logic of proceduralism has concomitantly originated in and recon-
structed this third ideational shift. The workings and mind-set of trade
professionals seem to have internalized this perspective through which to
interpret WTO provisions. Through the procedural approach, the trade
community, and especially the AB, has sought to interpret relevant WTO
provisions in such a way that leaves regulatory space open to member
states to pursue domestic policies depending on the manner in which this
is done. Such an attempt to avoid wading into political waters has, in fact,
created opportunities for frameworks that potentially shape the capacity
and incentive of other actors "to engage in effective problem-solving and
accountable norm elaboration."'10
Logically, the WTO review cannot be neutral as to the substance of
regulation and there is no way to preserve such regulatory autonomy if
"such autonomy is illusory to begin with."' 10 1 As a consequence, there are
negative outcomes associated with the turn to proceduralism. First, the
promise of enabling a larger regulatory space for countries' 0 2 seems un-
realistic, as a substantive aspect to regulatory space has not been put in
question. Second, the WTO's legitimacy crisis continues because the
results of WTO policy continue to evolve unattached to the substantive
outcomes it produces.' 0 3 Third, it creates a tendency to over-
"proceduralize" WTO law, attaching great weight and formalistic impli-
cation to every term in every treaty. Negotiators have become increas-
ingly aware of the legal maneuvers crafted through the WTO procedural
approach. It has fallen on their shoulders the responsibility of skillfully
interpreting and designing provisions that will not accrue unforeseen bur-
dens to their countries by this very active DSS.
This historical overview has evidenced how GATIIWTO ideational
and legal interpretative tendencies have oscillated between showing
97. Id.
98. Gregory Shaffer & Yvonne Apea, Institutional Choice in the General System of
Preferences Case: Who Decides the Conditions for Trade Preferences? The Law and
Politics of Rights, 39 J. WORLD TRADE 977 (2005).
99. Mortensen, supra note 96.
100. Joanne Scott & Susan Sturm, Courts as Catalysts: Re-Thinking the Judicial Role in
New Governance, 13 Coi-UM. J. Euiz. L. 565, 573 (2006).
101. LANG, supra note 2, at 346.
102. Michael Ming Du, The Rise of National Regulatory Autonomy in the GA TT/WTO
Regime, 14 J. INT'L ECON. L. 639, 673 (2011).
103. See generally Daniel C. Esty, The World Trade Organization's Legitimacy Crisis, 1
WORLD TRADE RFv. 7 (2002).
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greater or less deference to the political process of the preference pro-
vider. Also, to the role reserved for the AB "as a function of the open-
endedness of the created guidelines. ' 10 4 This last choice is the one cur-
rently chosen by the AB, through its reliance on procedural standards to
generate case-by-case "contextualized jurisprudence. ' 105 This part has
attempted to demonstrate that a social construction remains. What
seems like an inclination towards procedural-review methods responds to
a momentary focus on possibilities for legal paths and not on the motives
for their causation. The consequences of this choice become particularly
interesting in the current international economic context, as well as in
regard to the WTO's institutional challenges. The choice for procedural-
ism is not only a choice by the trade community but an influence upon it.
As the next part will attempt to demonstrate, proceduralism has contrib-
uted to a shift of momentum from rule-negotiations to the dispute litiga-
tion, adding to the complexity of ways in which trade rules are
understood and advanced in the WTO.
III. LAW, POLITICS, AND INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE
It has been argued that in the context of Doha negotiations the inter-
connectedness of WTO branches has brought about a shift of trade nego-
tiations from trade rounds to the judicial process.' 0 6 This is not, by any
means, an unforeseen phenomenon. Jackson, Hudec, and Davis had al-
ready argued that the post-Uruguay DSS operated in an atmosphere of
pure negotiation with the settlement procedure itself becoming part of
the negotiating tactics for various dispute settlement attempts.10 7 Thus,
although legislative gridlock and judicial law-making have frequently
been understood to walk hand in hand, 0 8 this relationship has provoked
a varied range of reactions in the context of the WTO. Whilst some have
found for an excessively activist AB others have observed a political ca-
pitulation of WTO members. 10 9 In recognizing that both approaches add
valuable insights to the matter; this paper observes that they remain in-
sufficient to wholly explain the logic of politics in the making of trade
law. For this reason, it provides a deeper inquiry into the formation and
the limits of this newly found political space inside the WTO's adjudica-
tive system.
104. Shaffer & Apea, supra note 98, at 996.
105. Id.
106. Goldstein & Steinberg, supra note 3, at 2.
107. John H. Jackson, The Role of Effectiveness of the WTO Dispute Settlement Mecha-
nism, in CLIMATE CHANGE, TRADE, AND COMPETIVENESS: IS A COLLISION INEVI-
TABLE? 179 (2000). The author remembers the cases of Costa Rica and Japan
against the United States and their success in advancing their claim in the years of
the WTO.
108. See Anne-Marie Burley & Walter Mattli, Europe Before the Court: A Political The-
ory of Legal Integration, 47 INT'L OJRG. 41 (1993); see also George Tsebelis &
Geoffrey Garrett, The Institutional Foundations of Intergovernmentalism and
Supranationalism in the European Union, 55 INT'L ORG. 357 (2003).
109. For an overview, see William J. Davey, Has the WTO Dispute Settlement System
Exceeded its Authority?, 4 J. INT'L ECON. L. 79 (2001).
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In analyzing this altered institutional framework, this Goldstein and
Steinberg argue that this institutional imbalance has "not only dead-
locked the legislative process that for half a century liberalized global
trade, but has also dampened the legislative check on judicial lawmak-
ing." 110 In saying this, the authors make a compelling case for a regula-
tory shift taking place at the WTO. As a result of such regulatory shift,
the authors argue that WTO's rule-making capacities have been trans-
ferred from its legislative organs, namely, Ministerial Conferences, to its
quasi-judicial organ, the DSS. 1 1I This "institutional paradox,"' 12 between
an efficient DSS and an inefficient political or legislative branch, has been
understood by great part of the literature as an institutional flaw.11 3 In
this sense, suggestions for reform are many and diverse.
Barfields argues that the two consensus requirements present at the
WTO are "constitutional flaws" of the WTO regime.11 4 He finds the con-
sensus required to block an AB report together with the consensus re-
quired to legislate are highly unworkable.11 5 Boldly, he suggests that the
issue might be solved by the possibility of a panel or AB report to be
blocked by a minority of one-third of WTO members representing one-
quarter of world trade.1 1 6 Alternatively, he suggests empowering a com-
mittee of the DSB or the WTO Director General to identify cases as po-
litical or as involving legal issues that are still ambiguous and thus forcing
parties to resolve their issues through political/diplomatic negotiations.' 17
Further exploring the issue, Amrita Narlikar sees usefulness in the insti-
tution of an executive board like the International Financial Institution to
overlook decision-making. 118 Cottier and Takenoshita, likewise, decon-
struct the concept of consensus voting to suggest a system of weighted
voting, based on each WTO member's trading power. 11 9
These reform proposals share an underlying belief that the current in-
stitutional imbalance between the deadlocked legislative and the freed
judicial branches of the WTO can potentially create serious systemic
problems for the GATT/WTO regime.' 20 This is mainly because these
circumstances have transformed the WTO DSS from a purely bilateral
110. Goldstein & Steinberg, supra note 3, at 2.
111. Id.
112. Joost Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, 104 MICH. L. REV. 1, 5-6
(2005).
113. Id.
114. CLAUDE E. BARFIELD, FREE TRADE, SOVEREIGNTY, DEMOCRACY: THE FUTURE
OF TIlE WORILD TRADE ORGANIZATION 5 (2002).
115. Id. at 9.
116. id.
117. Id. at 112-13.
118. Amrita Narlikar, The Politics of Participation: Decision-Making Processes and De-
veloping Countries in the World Trade Organization, 364 THE ROUND TABLE: THE
COMMONWEALTrI J. INT'L AFl. 171, 178-80 (2002).
119. Thomas Cottier & Sakoto Takenoshita, Decision-Making and the Balance of Pow-
ers in WTO Negotiations: Towards Supplementary Weighted Voting, in AT THE
CROSSROADS: THE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM AND TI-IE DOHA ROUND 181-231
(Stefan Griller ed., 2008).
120. Du, supra note 102, at 639-75.
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and reciprocal system of episodic dispute settlement "towards a multilat-
eral system with a regulatory character.' 12 1 Accordingly, worries also
arise as to the democratic character of this supposed new forum for inter-
national law making. 122 As Claus-Dieter Ehlermann puts it, this institu-
tional weakness breaches "the fundamental principle of democracy which
requires that judges are subject to the law, and that the law can be
changed by the legislator. '123 Although proponents of high-level panels
have favored this as a manner to create momentum for reform and un-
lock the political stalemate,'1 24 this practice puts in check principles of
international cooperation and accountability. 1 25 This is because, notwith-
standing that expert panel and AB opinions might sharpen the effective-
ness of an organization, and move it beyond immediate interests of
members, they do so without any means of legislative check or effective
mechanism for members' review.' 26
Others differ from this view. Pauwelyn argues that, although there is
indeed a sub-optimal institutional balance at the WTO, addressing it
through the lenses of a "law and politics" divide fails to grasp the com-
plexities of the WTO's institutional functioning. 2 7 For him, "the rule of
law" within the WTO was never entirely disassociated with the political
aspect of the institution.128 Progressive legalization within the trading
system was accompanied by a concomitant strengthening of political
mechanisms. 29 This was a necessary condition for the system's evolu-
tion. Hence, as the author argues, it is problematic to understand GATT/
WTO history and present through an evolutionary narrative from polit-
ics/power-based negotiations to law/rule-based negotiations: "[r]ather
than a paradox or puzzle, the juxtaposition of a strong, automatic dispute
settlement system.., and a tedious, consensus-based rulemaking process
... is a logical-although not necessarily optimal-phenomenon. '130
121. Richard B. Stewart & Michelle Ratton Sanchez Badin, The World Trade Organi-
zation and Global Administrative Law 11 (N.Y.U. Sch. of Law, Public Law & Le-
gal Theory Research Paper Series, Working Paper No. 09-71, 2009), available at
http://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstractid=1 518606.
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of the World Trade Organization, 44 DUKE L.J. 830, 914 (1995).
123. Claus-Dieter Ehlermann, Six Years on the Bench of the "World Trade Court":
Some Personal Experiences as Member of the Appellate Body of the World Trade
Organization, 36 J. WORLD TRADE 605, 636 (2002).
124. Pauwelyn, The Sutherland Report. A Missed Opportunity for Genuine Debate on
Trade, Globalization, and Reforming of the WTO, supra note 76.
125. Andrew T. Guzman, Food Fears: Health and Safety at the WTO, 45 VA. J. INT'L L.
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In this sense, there is an intimate and bi-directional interaction be-
tween the trade system's legal structure and its political mechanism.l 3
1
The legalization tendency that took place in the last three decades of the
twentieth century is thus logically accompanied by a growing desire and
need of participation in the WTO political process. Conversely, the lack
of a consensus rule would not have enabled the establishment and the
sustainment of a strong and automated DSS. Pauwelyn proceeds to con-
clude that limited exit and strong DSS in tandem with higher levels of
participation and politics is the best recipe for an effective and legitimate
world trade system. 132 Thereby, he understands that the WTO needs
more not less politics, more not less control by domestic politics, more not
less consideration of non-trade concerns.
At this point, this institutional understanding is important in order to
help grasp the complexities involved in current negotiations and in the
way law is being used in this scenario. This paper takes Pauwelyn's argu-
ment a step further to identify the extent to which this dichotomy be-
tween law and politics is deeply fictional within the trading regime. Just
as a low exit adjudicative system such as the WTO DSS requires high
political input to support it, 133 high political input requires a legal format
under which different sets of ideational values can be defended. This is
where the procedural use of WTO law comes in. Following Pauwelyn's
line of argument, progressive proceduralization should also be accompa-
nied by concomitant strengthening of the political mechanisms as a neces-
sary condition for the system's evolution.
The procedural interpretation of WTO rules allows for a much broader
set of ideational perspectives to be considered as being, possibly, legiti-
mate. By allowing considerations of measures designed with all sorts of
different purposes, it seems to increase the political input of the organiza-
tion. Also, it presents itself as an alternative for the narrow economic
analysis of trade barriers during the neoliberal era. This interpretation of
WTO law has a direct impact on Rules Negotiations as well as on percep-
tions of the effects and biases of trade law. Portraying itself as a neutral
medium to resolve political and economic claims, the AB's choice for a
process-based review impacts on Rules Negotiations to the extent that it
becomes a choice about a right procedural path instead of an underlying
substantive value.
More interestingly, the procedural approach itself greatly allows for
this role shift between adjudicative and legislative functions of the WTO.
This approach to WTO law has enabled the adjudicative bodies to pre-
serve their legitimacy amongst members of the trade community13 4 while
providing an immediate response to members' social concerns. This is
131. Id. at 339.
132. Id. at 340.
133. Id. at 339.
134. See Joseph H.H. Weiler, The Rule of Lawyers and the Ethos of Diplomats: Reflec-
tions on the Internal and External Legitimacy of the WTO Dispute Settlement, 35 J.
WORLD TRADE 191 (2001).
2014]
228 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 20
mainly because it leaves a margin of room for legalism to craft socially
friendly trade barriers according to predefined standards. Hence, the
process-based review has proved to be an efficient tool for maintaining
the WTO's external legitimacy 135 whilst avoiding committed engagement
with non-trade concerns. This second aspect of the "law and politics"
debate within the WTO is of equal importance. This is because any de-
bate about the reform of WTO legal and judicial systems needs to take
into account the role that the legal language being used performs within
the organization. So long as the equilibrium between law and politics is
maintained through a common understanding of how the law works
within the WTO, this role needs to be further explored.
A. TOWARDS LIBERALIZATION OR AUTONOMY?
The consequences of the so-called "regulatory shift" have been largely
explored. In the uncertainty brought by this shift to judicialization, a ten-
dency to litigate instead of negotiate advances in trade law has been as-
tutely commented on. 136 Goldstein and Steinberg have suggested that
the Doha Deadlocks and its opened space for litigation have initiated an
era of judicial liberalization at the WTO. 137 Their argument can be sum-
marized as follows: unanticipated institutional and political developments
have led to a collapse of the legislative process, thus transforming the
DSS into a venue for lawmaking. Given that the very nature of dispute
settlement relies on the asymmetry of many exporters against a single
import-competing group, it "creates the political space that pushes liber-
alization forward. ' 138 Consequently, the authors conclude that judicial
lawmaking is not only taking over the place of multilateral lawmaking, it
is doing so with a "liberalizing bias." 139
In a parallel argument, Mortensen suggests that the legalization pro-
cess of the WTO has been highly asymmetrical, privileging liberalization
and producer interests as opposed to safeguarding the provision of public
goods and consumer interests.' 40 He argues that "decentralised bargain-
ing processes surrounding the WTO and the legal activities within the
WTO are two sides of the same coin.' 141 In addition, he suggests that the
WTO is undergoing two mutually constitutive processes of legalization
and privatization. In this sense, the rule of law is by no means the end of
politics. 142 In reality, legalization at the WTO has tended to facilitate
trade liberalization in response to private initiative on specific issues. 143
135. Id.
136. Markus Gehring, Litigating the Way Out of the Deadlock, in DEADLOCKS IN MUL-
TILATERAL NEGOTIATIONS: CAUSES AND SOLUTIONS 96, 104-117 (Amrita Narkilar
ed., 2010).
137. See Goldstein & Steinberg, supra note 3.
138. Id. at 32.
139. Id. at 15.
140. Mortensen, supra note 96, at 195.
141. Id. at 193.
142. Id. at 177.
143. Id. at 195.
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Its DSS, consequently, results from "politics of judicialization" and is sub-
ject to private misuse. Likewise, respected authors have argued that in
light of recent institutional changes, the DSS has not yet shown enough
deference to members' trade policy decisions and that the system is bi-
ased towards trade liberalization. 14
4
On these accounts, Goldstein and Steinberg explore the possibility of
"liberalization through litigation" so as to identify advantages and disad-
vantages of this phenomenon.145 Positively, this institutional adaptation
would have worked as an engine to keep the organization and the "trade
bicycle" running. It has increased "efficiency of the organisation and en-
hanced open trade by freeing member states from capture by entrenched
domestic interests. ' 146 On the downside, judicial liberalization is suppos-
edly limited in its pace, reduced in its scope, and shallow in its depth.1 47
This perception of the role played by the DSS is not, however,
unanimous.
Following a different line of thought, some of the literature identifies a
reinjection of governmental intention behind each measure. Ming Du ar-
gues that the shift in balance between WTO branches has allowed for a
broader regulatory autonomy of WTO members.148 For him, regulatory
autonomy left for members is always contestable under WTO agree-
ments.149 Recent case law, according to him, has shown much more insti-
tutional sensitivity and is increasingly more deferential to members'
national regulatory autonomy. °5 0 He also uses the changing jurispru-
dence under article XX of the GATT as well as the resurrection of the
GATT's "aims and effects" test of a measure under article 111:4 as proof
of this increased deference.1 5' Of the same mind, Knox adopts a literal
interpretation of the agreements so as to fit signs of multilateral political
agreement in non-trade contexts.' 52 In overviewing the first ten years of
WTO's judicial balance of trade and environment disputes, it can be con-
cluded that the AB has "greened trade jurisprudence."'1 53
It seems, therefore, that an analysis of the effects of this judicial shift
has mixed results. It has taken form of an institutional and legal adapta-
tion constructed by the trade community for less, not more politics, con-
144. See John Greenwald, WTO Dispute Settlement: An Exercise in Trade Law Legisla-
tion, 6 J. INr. ECON. L. 113, 123 (2003); See also, John Ragosta et al., WTO Dispute
Settlement: the System is Flawed and Must Be Fixed, 37 INT'L LAW. 697, 727 (2003);
John R. Magnus et al., What Do All These Adverse WTO Decisions Mean?,
TRADEWINS (Jan. 20, 2003), http://www.tradewinsllc.net/publi/GULC-1-03.pdf.
145. Goldstein & Steinberg, supra note 3, at 15.
146. Id. at 3.
147. Id. at 33.
148. Du, supra note 84, at 639-75.
149. Id. at 654.
150. Id. at 655.
151. Id. at 655-58.
152. See John H. Knox, The Judicial Resolution of Conflicts between Trade and Envi-
ronment Conflicts, 28 HARV. ENVTL. L. Riv. 1, 48 (2004).
153. Id. at 47-48.
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trary to Pauwelyn's pleadings. 154 Thus, this procedural approach is not a
result of a concrete re-imagination of the WTO. Instead, it is an institu-
tional and practical response to a context of dissatisfied international
voices. It is not grounded in any common agreement amongst its mem-
bers as to its normative and descriptive effects. For this reason, interpre-
tations of the current dynamics diverge. There has been no consensus on
what comprises a member's "regulatory autonomy" just as there has been
no agreement on what comprises "liberalization" at this point in time.
This empty legalistic response has been successful in calming spirits and
compensating for slow-paced negotiations, but its usefulness, if any, ends
there.
The second important point to be made has to do with the inverse ef-
fect that this "judicial shift" has on Rule Negotiations. Although it has
originated from a deadlocked scenario, 155 the "judicial shift" has had the
cyclical effect of adding to the complexity of negotiations. It demands an
increasing amount of political input in negotiations to accompany the so-
phisticated decision-making taking place at the DSS. The strengthened
and active panels and AB have also shown to have great influence on
agenda setting for rules negotiations and have contributed with uncertain
legal methods and lack of engagement with non-trade concerns through
frequent legal maneuvers.' 56 This approach to law, characterized by daily
institutional choices and process-based reviews also adds to the legal and
political difficulty of rules negotiations.
B. INSTITUTIONAL CHOICES AND IMPLICATIONS FOR NEGOTIATIONS
As exemplified above, this paper finds it somewhat complicated to de-
lineate political consequences associated with a turn to "judicialization"
of the WTO. For such, a broader concept of the phenomenon of legaliza-
tion and the resulting process-based review is needed. This understand-
ing is valid insofar as it is capable of analyzing the effect that these
choices have had on aspects of legitimacy as well as on underlying social
practice at the WTO. 57 Hence, an analysis of the institutional choices
available to the panels and AB seems to be closely associated with the
initial purposive interpretation of law presented in the first section of Part
II. What is needed is not an evaluation of possible overreaching of the
panels and AB in their decision-making capacities but rather, inquiries
into the nature of the process by which those decisions are made. 158 As
such, this section is dedicated to exploring and understanding the ways
that these decisions have been made in the present expanded political
mandate of the DSS.
154. Pauwelyn, The Transformation of World Trade, supra note 112.
155. Goldstein & Steinberg, supra note 3, at 31.
156. See BARFIELD, supra note 114, at 45-46.
157. Martha Finnemore & Stephen J. Toope, Alternatives to "Legalization": Richer
Views of Law and Politics, 55 INT'L ORG. 743, 744 (2001).
158. Debra P. Steger, Book Review: Free Trade, Sovereignty, Democracy: The Future of
the World Trade Organization, 5 J INT'L ECON. L. 565, 569 (2002).
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It is no news that WTO law contains a plethora of major gaps, ambigui-
ties, and contradictory elements. These have been the sources of agree-
ment and disagreements of members since the creation of the GAT/
WTO system. As Posner insightfully explains, legal (and WTO) texts
may be indeterminate and vague due to a basic tension between on the
one hand: "the willingness of legislator to draft laws using all-encompass-
ing language in order to subsume the maximum number of transactions,
and, [on the other hand,] the limits inherent in our human nature to pre-
dict future events on which we have, at the stage of drafting, imperfect
information." 159
Jackson comments that gaps are necessary in order to get the consent
required to come to a resolution. 160 In this sense, "diplomats gloss over
real differences with language that both sides can interpret the way they
want to in order to reach a meeting of the minds as to language."' 16 1 Cur-
rently, however, gaps, overlaps, and constructive ambiguities have be-
come the "battleground" for the WTO's search of legitimacy. As Steger
argues, this battle is staged in the DSS, through the many ways in which
these gaps are interpreted and the political implication of each interpreta-
tional route. 162 So far, as argued in the previous section, this battle has
not yet yielded any definitive biased inclination. Instead, adjudication
has taken the route of "proceduralism" and has barely recognized that it,
in fact, has political implications. It is with this in mind that this paper
will further explore the ideational and legal turn to "proceduralism"-
explained in Part II-to inquire into the possibilities and consequences of
the panels' and AB's institutional choices.
The decade of Doha significantly altered the previous underlying logic
of trade law interpretation. Thus, the first legal consequence of this turn
to methods, institutions, and process-based reviews is the unwillingness of
the DSS to engage in substantive decisions that involve balancing of val-
ues that the negotiating members have equally failed to achieve. 1 63 The
logic of "proceduralism," as explained above, finds a way to avoid sub-
stantive value judgments and is presented as an appropriate basis for in-
ternational oversight of domestic procedures and legislation. 1 64 As Von
Bogdandy explains, national procedures tend to merely reflect domestic
interests, ignoring foreign interests that are deeply affected through these
decisions.1 6 5 Such foreign interests, with no standing in domestic proce-
159. Bernard M. Hoekman & Petros C. Mavroidis, The Dark Side of the Moon: 'Com-
pleting' the WTO Contract through Adjudication, GILOBAi GOVERNANCE PRO-
GRAMME (Nov. 2012), http://globalgovernanceprogramme.eui.eu/wp-content/up
loads/2012/11/Hoekman-Mavroidis-MESSERLIN-FESTFIN.pdf; see RICHARD
A. POSNER, OVERCOMING LAW (1995).
160. JOHN H. JACKSON, SOVEREIGNTY, T[HE WTO AND CHANGING FUNDAMENTrALS OF
INTERNATIONAL LAW 148 (2006).
161. Id.
162. Steger, supra note 158, at 565.
163. LANG, supra note 2, at 323-24.
164. Id. at 328.
165. Armin V. Bogdandy, Law and Politics in the WTO-Strategies to Cope with a Defi-
cient Relationship, 5 MAX PLANCK Y.B. UNITED NATIONS L. 609, 666 (2001).
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dures, reflect the transnational impact of internal measures. 166 In the
case of WTO law, the author argues that the AB can rectify this through
a process of "simulated multilateralism" in the domestic process of legis-
lation. 167 This process-based review upholds principles of due process
and basic fairness, which the AB developed on the basis of article X: 3 of
the GATT.168 He notes, nevertheless, that, "[p]rocedural requirements
have the function of serving the accomplishment of substantive obliga-
tions and cannot function as a general substitute for them.' 69
Whilst it has not gone unnoticed that "proceduralism" may manifest in
different manners, they share an alternating tendency from principles of
transparency, accountability, participation, and rational democratic delib-
eration to other regulatory decision-making processes. As follows from
Trachtman and Shaffer's Institutional Choice framework, the interpreta-
tive approach that the AB chooses to undertake is particularly important
insofar as it directly relates to policy discretion in treaty implementa-
tion.170 The authors' proposed framework tries to map the behavior of
the AB and the DSS in the midst of this judicialization tendency of the
WTO. The choice of a particular method is dependent on the specifics of
the case and on the efficiency of each determined approach. 171 More ac-
curately, they account for the relationship between judicial interpretative
choices and its effects on international governance.' 72 Their point is
there is no right answer or pre-determined consequence regarding the
approach chosen by the AB.
To this purpose, they outline some of the ways in which the WTO
panels and ABs effectively delegate responsibility to different social deci-
sion-making processes: more specifically, allocating decision-making to
WTO process or subsets of WTO members; recognizing other interna-
tional political processes through international law; textually incorporat-
ing other international law and delegation to international standard-
setting bodies, as well as delegation to experts regarding factual issues.173
Secondly, in cases of evident conflict of social goals, the panels and ABs
find themselves choosing between interlinked legal strategies to deal with
the claims.' 74 These are the institutional choices of judicial balancing,
deference to states and process-based reviews. Finally, given that there
seems to exist a very thin and unexplored line separating these institu-
tional choices, great uncertainty remains regarding the method that will
be chosen in each dispute, as well as the consequences they will unleash.
166. Id.
167. See id. at 667.
168. Id. at 669.
169. Id. at 667.
170. Gregory Shaffer & Joel Trachtman, Interpretation and Institutional Choice at the
WTO, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 103, 152 (2011).
171. See id. at 152-53.
172. Id. at 153.
173. Id. at 120-35.
174. Id. at 106.
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In light of this, it is necessary to remember that these institutional
choices mapped by Schaffer and Trachtmann are not merely legal phe-
nomena and interpretative techniques. 175 Instead, they are part of a dis-
cursive practice that takes place within the WTO community through
thoughts and arguments (ideas) of members and an iterative and ritual-
ized process (discourse) that eventually institutionalized these ideas as
norms. 176 In this sense, narrow conceptions of law and legalization,
177
associated with the mere manifestation of law in public bureaucracies, fail
to describe the politics of legalization at the WTO as well as institutional
consequences associated with it. Accordingly, in recognizing that there
are benefits and costs associated with different kinds of legalization, it is
necessary to observe the substantive and political consequences of this
legal turn.178
As Finnemore and Toope argue, a broader vision of law is necessary to
direct more attention to procedures, methodologies, and processes that
generate legitimacy in and of themselves. 179 This is the reason why these
approaches also need to be understood as a constituent of law insofar as
they affect its application and outcomes. The adherence to legal process
values is a move to a "very particular kind of law."' 80 Finnemore and
Toope argue that such an approach is necessary to explore the causes'
nature and effects of legal legitimacy.' 81 With the increased perception of
a "narrow" legalization, critiques on WTO law have insufficiently focused
on long-term systemic that this turn to "proceduralism" and DSS legal
methods might result in.
This review of members' measures is not solely restricted to principles
of due process enshrined in the GAT-f. It is also largely discussed in
matters of health and scientific risk in the Sanitary and Phytosanitary
Measures (SPS) and Technical Barriers to Trade (TBT) agreements. 182
The role of science in trade disciplines has been a polemic issue since the
Uruguay Round.' 83 The "Three Sister Organizations"-the Codex Ali-
mentarius (Codex), the International Office for Epizootics (OIE), and
the International Plant Protection Convention (IPPC)-are often seen as
quasi-legislators' 84 and yet another undemocratic and procedural manner
of advancing WTO law. For example, it was largely discussed in the
EC-Hormones dispute where the WTO was accused of overriding do-
175. Id. at 103.
176. Sungjoon Cho, Beyond Rationality: A Sociological Construction of the World
Trade Organization, 52 VA. J. INT'L L. 321, 327 (2012).
177. For precision, obligation and delegation, see Kenneth W. Abbott & Duncan
Snidal, Hard and Soft Law in International Governance, 54 lrrr'i. ORG. 421, 438
(2000).
178. Id. at 421.
179. Finnemore & Toope, supra note 157, at 744.
180. Id. at 750.
181. Id. at 751.
182. Joel P. Trachtman, Regulatory Jurisdiction and the WTO, 10 J INT'l ECON. L. 631,
650 (2007).
183. Id. at 632.
184. Id. at 649.
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mestic regulatory choices of members due to the procedure-based ap-
proach chosen by the AB with regard to the importation of genetically
modified organisms (GMOs) meat into the European Community.1 85
The idea of "science as a neutral arbiter" as a parameter for contestability
of domestic regulation 186 has many times been counterweighted to the
effective existence of sound science and methodology free from policy
and value judgments. 187 Parallels are observed in cases involving the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures (ASCM or SCM
Agreement) and the Anti-Dumping Agreement as they often refer to ex-
pert opinion and economic analysis of the effects of domestic and interna-
tional trade law.188 This specific "crafting of trade law" has been named
in different contexts and disputes analysis as "judicial minimalism' 89 and
"passive virtue of judicial decision making."'190
It is due to this uncertainty and to the concomitant stagnation in rules
negotiations that litigation has become an interesting option for WTO
members to engage in, in this sub-optimal rule-making process. In under-
standing the complexity of multilateral negotiations and in observing the
unusual high engagement of the AB in providing answers for members'
trade concerns, strategies of rule-advancing through litigation have been
described. 91 Lack of clarity regarding political effects of judicial liberali-
zation in specifics, as explained in the previous section, leaves one other
important consequence that arises with this tendency of process-based re-
view. Decisions have become gradually more deferential to the words
used in the WTO agreement, which are often read in clinical isolation
from their context. 92 What is found is a lack of legal reasoning by judges
questioning and answering the functions of any given legal instrument.
Rulings are also very often criticized for lacking economic logic (see sub-
sidies below), 193 calling for neither economic analysis nor purely legal
analysis of case law but rather, more consistent quality of case law. Thus,
it seems that the effects of trade legalization on world politics in the long
run will depend on its continuing uneven spread. Its spread will depend
on the evolution of international norms, its consequences for domestic
and transnational politics, and its perceived benefits for key actors.
185. Jan Bohanes, Risk Regulation and WTO Law: A Procedure-Based Approach to the
Precautionary Principle, 40 COLUM. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 323, 327-36 (2002).
186. Joanne Scott, European Regulation of GMOs and the WTO, 9 COLUM. J. EUR. L.
213, 233 (2003).
187. David Winickoff et al., Adjudicating the GM Food Wars: Science, Risk, and De-
mocracy in World Trade Law, 30 YALE J. INT'L L. 81, 93 (2005).
188. See Paul C. Rosenthal & Robert T.C. Vermylen, The WTO Antidumping and Sub-
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Round?, 31 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 871, 871-72 (2000).
189. CAss R. SUNSTFIN, ONE CASE AT A TIME: JUDICIAL MINIMALISM ON Tn-IEL SU-
PRE ME COURT, 261 (1999); see LANG, supra note 2, at 341.
190. Jeffrey L. Dunoff, The Death of Trade Regime, 10 EUR. J. INT'L L. 733, 757-58
(1999).
191. Gehring, supra note 136, at 96-98.
192. Goldstein & Steinberg, supra note 3, at 20.
193. ANDREW T. GUZMAN & ALAN 0. SYKES, RESEARCH HANDBOOK IN INTERNA-
TIONAL ECONOMIC LAW, 208 (2007).
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IV. INSTITUTIONAL CHOICE AND RULES NEGOTIATIONS:
A CASE STUDY THROUGH SUBSIDIES
The fourth and final Part of this paper will provide a concrete example
of the theoretical observations found in Parts II and III. It will focus on
the political room that the panels and AB have been provided in disputes
under the ASCM. Subsidy law is particularly helpful to illustrate the re-
interpretative biases that have shaped WTO law. As Hoekman and Kos-
tecki have put it,194 multilateral subsidy rules are deeply connected to
understandings of desirable forms of government intervention, rather
than merely as the product of protectionist business lobbies. From the
nineteenth-century U.S. law on sugar targeting export duties to a com-
plex ASCM in 1993, subsidies are continuously reinterpreted under trade
law. An analysis of the frequency in which cases are brought under the
ASCM shows that uncertainty remains as to the definition provided by
article I of the ASCM and its Illustrative Lists. 195
The cases commented on below indicate that the development of sub-
sidy regulation over the past decades has failed to encompass all the po-
litical changes in the current role of subsidies in domestic and
international governance. Departing from a neoclassical economic ap-
proach that found no use for subsidies in governmental policy space, dis-
tinct categories of subsidies have come to be crafted under WTO law.
Research and development subsidies have now been openly used in over
two decades, governmental bailouts to financial institutions are among
many actions that call for a re-discussion of the underlying purpose of this
governance instrument. DSS' interpretation, however, remains in a
"state of denial."1 96 As the DSS comes to operate in a skillful procedural
manner, skepticism remains as to the sustainability and effectiveness of
such approach. The WTO (and its DSS) need to demonstrate greater
consciousness of the problems that are inherent in the ASCM. Attaching
substantive meaning and follow-through effects to the norms that have
come to be textually interpreted seems to be an adequate path to pursue.
As will be demonstrated, the technique of well-crafted decisions, as a
manner to derive abstract, general, and prospective rules from individual
cases,197 works in the opposite direction of clarifying WTO law' 98 and
advancing negotiations. A less evasive style of judging can already be
seen in some of the U.S.-China Countervailing Duties disputes where
194. See generally BERNARD HOEKMAN & MICHEi KosTECKI, Tri POLITICAL ECON-
OMY OF TE WORLD TRADING SYSTEM: WTO AND) BIuYOND (2nd ed. 2001).
195. Steven McGuire, Between Pragmatism and Principle: Legalization, Political Econ-
omy, and the WTO Subsidy Agreement, 16 THE INT'L TRADE J. 319, 339-40 (2002).
196. Sadeq Z. Bigdeli, The WTO SCM Agreement Jurisprudence and the Evolving
Concept of Government (Aug. 19, 2012) (unpublished paper) (presented at the
Society of International Economic Law Conference Singapore).
197. Alec S. Sweet, Judicialization and the Construction of Governance, 32 COMP. POL.
STUD. 147, 156-57 (1999).
198. World Trade Organization, Ministerial Declaration of 14 November 2001, WT/
MIN(01)/DEC/1, 41 I.L.M. 746, 750 (2002).
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governmental and ideational ideas are increasingly in shock. 199 Argua-
bly, this is a step forward towards abandoning the heritage of past idea-
tional interpretative tendencies. Not only so, the current and present
struggles with climate change policies will come to demand a straightfor-
ward legal method of analysis and of social response to the WTO.
A. BRAZIL-AIRCRAFT
The Brazil-Aircraft dispute had its compliance proceedings completed
just with the start of the Doha Round of Negotiations. 200 Even so, having
experienced at least seven years of WTO's institutional changes, it is
noteworthy at this point in time. The dispute was substantially linked to
article XVI of the GATT and centered upon some crucial points of the
ASCM, specifically the burden of proof under articles 27, 27.4, 27.5, and
the definition of a subsidy under article 1, as well as the link between
permissible export subsidies in article 3.1 (a) and the Illustrative List of
annex 1.201 Due to the purposes and necessarily limited nature of this
study, the latter will be used as a case example of the delicate balance
found by the Panel and the AB in addressing such provisions.
The key issue in dispute was Canada's complaint regarding the Brazil-
ian PROEX system of financing exports on sales of aircrafts by Brazilian
manufacturer EMBRAER. In a simplistic overview, the Brazilian pro-
gram sought to provide interest rate equalization subsidies for sales by
Brazilian exporters, mainly EMBRAER. This equalization system added
up to 3.8 percentage points of the actual interest rate of any transac-
tion,20 2 thus reducing the overall costs of the manufacturer. Based on
such data, the Panel considered that Brazilian equalization system quali-
fied as a subsidy within the meaning of article 3.1 (1) of that Agree-
ment.203 Subsequently, it also found that Brazil failed to comply with the
burden of proof criteria under article 27 and that; therefore, it was in
breach of the provisions of the ASCM.20 4
Although Brazil rightfully agreed that the PROEX was indeed a sub-
sidy under article 1 of the ASCM, it contested that its interest equaliza-
tion was permitted by the specific terms of article (k) of the Illustrative
List in annex I. Thus, central to the disagreement between the parties
was the interpretation of item (k) of the Illustrative List of annex I.
Under this specific item, Brazil understood that "such payments were
prohibited only 'insofar as they are used to secure a material advantage in
199. See Panel Report, United States-Definitive Anti-Dumping and Countervailing Du-
ties on Certain Products from China, WT/DS379/R (Oct. 22, 2010).
200. Compliance confirmed on August 23, 2001. Dispute Settlement: Dispute DS46 Bra-
zil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, WORiLD TRADE ORGANIZATION,
http://www.wto.org/english/tratop-e/dispu-e/cases-e/ds46_e.htm (last visited Apr.
29, 2014).
201. Panel Report, Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, para. 4.151, WT/
DS46/R (Apr. 14, 1999) [hereinafter Brazil-Aircraft Panel Report].
202. Id. para. 2.3.
203. Id. paras. 7.13-7.14.
204. Id. para. 7.57.
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the field of export credit terms,' and that a contrario 'such payments are
permitted in so far as they are not used to secure a material advantage in
the field of export credit terms." 2 0 5 Furthermore, PROEX payments,
instead, were understood by Brazil as subsidies intended to match the
subsidies provided by the government of Canada to Canadian company
Bombardier.206
Canada and the European Communities (as a third party to the dis-
pute), on the other hand, argued that Footnote number five should be
used to establish that a measure is "permitted" by the ASCM. 20 7 More
controversially, they argued that a measure that does not fall under the
Illustrative List of Export Subsidies, namely, under the first paragraph of
item (k), or does not fall within the scope of that footnote is prohibited.
In addition, Canada rejected the Brazilian view that PROEX payments
are the "payment by [governments] of all or part of the costs incurred by
exporters or financial institutions in obtaining credits" and also argued
that the PROEX payments were in fact in breach of the "material advan-
tage" clause in the first paragraph of item (k). 20 8
Relying on a step-by-step procedural approach, the Panel conducted a
review of Brazil's item (k) defense. This review entailed: i) finding that
PROEX payments are the "payment by [governments] of all or part of
the costs incurred by exporters or financial institutions in obtaining cred-
its" within the meaning of item (k); ii) finding that PROEX payments are
not "used to secure a 'material advantage' in the field of export credit
terms" within the meaning of item (k); and iii) finding that a "payment"
within the meaning of item (k) which is not "used to secure a 'material
advantage' in the field of export credit terms" is "permitted" by the
ASCM even though it is a subsidy within the meaning of article 1 of the
ASCM, which is contingent upon export performance within the meaning
of article 3.1 (a) of that Agreement. 20 9
In avoiding the need to scrutinize the three cumulative points of meth-
odological review, the Panel dismissed Brazil's claim on the basis of its
view of the "material advantage" clause constituting an affirmative de-
fense. As Brazil had argued that the burden of proof was allocated on
the challenged party, this was seen to go largely against that which had
been established by WTO jurisprudence, 210 thus failing its invocation of
article 24.7 of the ASCM. Whilst the AB upheld all the findings of the
205. Id. para. 7.15. The a contrario approach in subsidy law is seen as a "saga." See
MARC BENITAH, THE LAW OF SUBSIIIES UNDER -rim-_ GAYJ/WTO SYs'lElM 140-51
(2001).
206. Appellate Body Report, Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft, para.
16, WT/DS46/AB/R (July 21, 2000) [hereinafter Brazil-Aircraft AB Report].
207. Brazil-Aircraft Panel Report, supra note 201, para. 7.16.
208. Id.
209. Id. para. 7.17.
210. See Appellate Body Report, United States-Measure Affecting Imports of Woven
Wool Shirts and Blouses from India, WT/DS33/AB/R at 16 (Apr. 25, 1997) ("It is
only reasonable that the burden of establishing [an affirmative] defence should
rest on the party asserting it.").
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Panel, it reversed and modified the Panel's interpretation of "used to se-
cure a material advantage in export credit terms.' '211 Nevertheless, it up-
held the Panel's conclusion that Brazil failed to establish that the
payments fell within the first paragraph of item (k) as well as its conse-
quential finding that the PROEX payments were prohibited export subsi-
dies under article 3.1(a). 212 As can be observed, in the midst of the
methodology put forward to establish compliance with item (k), the defi-
nition of "material advantage" had a significant role in this dispute.
For Brazil, the crux of the dispute seemed to be the interpretation of
clause (k). For Brazil, the Panel's interpretation reduced the "material
advantage" requirement to "redundancy or inutility. '213 Theoretically,
this interpretative approach used by the Panel would grant comparative
advantage to the purchaser with respect to each transaction in question.
Brazil's defense rested on the Panel's interpretation of the "material ad-
vantage" clause (footnote five of the Agreement specifies that annex I
contains not only a list of prohibited exported subsidies but also measures
that do not constitute export subsidies) in items (h), (i), and (k). Insofar
as government payments were not used to secure a "material advantage"
in the field of export credit terms, Brazil contended that they were a con-
trario, permitted.214 The relevant facts and legal matters of the dispute
are interesting for the purposes of this paper insofar as they help to iden-
tify the many levels of the legal and political dynamics that are present
within the WTO.
1. Procedural Review
Following the above-mentioned frameworks of "proceduralism" and
institutional choices taken by the AB as appropriate to solving specific
disputes, Brazil-Aircraft helps to illustrate how these tendencies become
clearer in practice. The vagueness of concepts such as "material advan-
tage" 215 and the language used in paragraph (k) are useful examples of
legal trends that have been developing within the WTO. This first exam-
ple is particularly curious given that it shows how undefined substantive
concepts in WTO regulation are analyzed in the midst of very technical
and procedural reviews. 216 Due to this logic they are seldom the main
focus of analysis and are sidelined when an easier legalistic disqualifying
alternative is available.
This seemed to be the case when the Panel first interpreted the term
"used to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit
211. Brazil-Aircraft Panel Report, supra note 201, para. 7.17.
212. Brazil-Aircraft AB Report, supra note 206, para. 196.
213. Second Submission of Brazil, Brazil-Export Financing Programme for Aircraft,
WT/DS46/RW/2 (Mar. 16, 2001) at B-25 n.38, available at http://www.wto.org/eng
lish/tratop-e/dispuse/46rw2_c-e.pdf.
214. Brazil-Aircraft AB Report. supra note 206, para. 20.
215. See generally Brazil-Aircraft Panel Report, supra note 201.
216. Id. para. 7.17.
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terms. '2 1 7 In turning the issue into a three-step process analysis, it char-
acterized "material advantage" as "materially more favorable as the
terms that would have been available in the absence of the payment.
2 18
Although the Panel's interpretation changed considerably throughout the
report, oscillating from "as simply 'more favourable than the terms that
would otherwise be available in the marketplace"' to a mere "advan-
tage, '219 it was unsuccessful in providing an acceptable meaning to the
term "material advantage." In handing down its decision, the Panel did
not rule on whether the export subsidies for regional aircraft under
PROEX were indeed "payment by [governments] of all or part of the
costs incurred by exporters or financial institutions in obtaining cred-
its."'220 Nor did it opine on whether a "payment" within the meaning of
item (k), which is not "used to secure a material advantage within the
field of export credit terms" is, a contrario, "permitted. '22 1
The AB then paid significantly more attention to the meaning of "ma-
terial advantage" under item (k). In noting that the Panel erred in its
analysis, 222 it also recalled that the Panel's benchmark for determining
what constituted a "material advantage" for comparing the subsidies on
sales of regional aircraft was found to be solely the "marketplace" in
which they were bought and sold.223 This definition is a matter of great
importance under the ASCM and one that is eagerly avoided by the
DSS.
2 2 4
It is important to note that by the absence of appropriate benchmarks
or even "market-benchmarks," the interpretation and application of the
ASCM currently depends on evaluations by domestic Export Credit
Agencies (ECA), the framework of the Organization for Economic Co-
operation and Development (OECD) and the WTO. It is no news, there-
fore, that the way in which those rules have been written creates an
"unbalanced playing field between developing and developed coun-
tries. ' 225 As Soprano has put it, the lack of global rules to calculate inter-
est or premium as well as ECAs guidelines has left a normative gap that
has been fielded by an international arrangement organized by the
217. Id. paras. 7.19-7.22; Brazil-Aircraft AB Report, supra note 206, para. 171.
218. Brazil-Aircraft AB Report, supra note 206, para. 176.
219. Id.
220. Brazil-Aircraft Panel Report, supra note 201, para. 7.17.
221. Id.
222. The AB also clarified the distinction between "benefit" in article 1.1(b) of the
SCM Agreement to the "material advantage" clause in item (k) of the Illustrative
List. Brazil-Aircraft AB Report, supra note 206, para. 179.
223. Id. paras. 177-78.
224. The term "material advantage" refers to the last sentence of the first paragraph of
item (k) "in so far as they are used to secure a 'material advantage' in the field of
export credit terms." Brazil-Aircraft Panel Report, supra note 201, para. 7.15.
225. See Roberto Soprano, Doha Reform of WTO Export Credit Provisions in the SCM
Agreement: The Perspective of Developing Countries 44 J. OF WORLD TRADE 611
(2010).
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OECD.2 2 6 In its reasoning, the AB assured not to be persuaded by "the
safe haven" of the "OECD exemption." According to OECD standards,
officially-supported export credit terms provided by another government
are allowed to be matched by countries of the OECD Arrangement.227
Nevertheless, it is not too uncommon to see horizontal linkages and real-
location of authority with non-WTO Agreements under the WTO norma-
tive system. This is precisely the case for item (k) and the OECD
Arrangement. 228
Substantive ideas remained untouched. While the Panel and AB
avoided threading into domestic regulation, they upheld the Gentlemen's
Agreement concluded in 1978. This OECD Agreement provides neither
sanctions nor sanction mechanisms in the case of violation of the Ar-
rangement's provisions. The linkage between the Arrangement and the
ASCM may make a violation or derogation (and the matching thereof) of
the Arrangement a violation of WTO norms.229 Also, it greatly contrasts
with the Brazilian understanding of "material advantage." In Brazil's
view, the proper benchmark for determining whether PROEX payments
are "used to secure a material advantage in the field of export credit
terms" was to compare the export credit terms of transactions supported
by PROEX payments with the export credit terms available to purchasers
of Canadian regional aircraft. 230 The concept of "material advantage" for
Brazil, necessarily needed to relate to "advantage vis-A-vis someone or
something."' 231 Thus, to secure a "material advantage" in the field of ex-
port credit terms, Brazil's risk as well as Canada's subsidies to Bombar-
dier had to be taken into account.232
As can be seen from the above arguments, Brazil's concerns relate to
the impact that the meaning of the "material advantage" clause may have
in protecting the rights of developing countries' members. Through this
perspective, developed country members have negotiated for themselves,
in the second paragraph of item (k), a special safe haven from the export
subsidy prohibition for export credit practices that conform to the inter-
est rate provisions of the OECD Arrangement on Guidelines for Offi-
cially Supported Export Credits. 233
226. OECD, Premium and Related Conditions: Explanation of the Premium Rules of the
Arrangement on Officially Supported Export Credits (the Knaepen Package), TD/
PG(2004)I0/FINAL (July 6, 2004).
227. Brazil-Aircraft AB Report, supra note 206, para. 185.
228. See Andrew M. Moravcsik, Disciplining Trade Finance: The OECD Export Credit
Arrangement, 43 INT'L ORG. 173 (1989); See generally Janet K. Levit, The Dynam-
ics of International Trade Finance Regulation: The Arrangement on Officially Sup-
ported Export Credits, 45 HARV. INT'i L.J. 65 (2004).
229. ANDREAS F. LOWENF LD, INTERNATIONAL ECONOMIC LAW 225 (2002) ("one may
say that at least de facto, the WTO Agreement combined with the Dispute Settle-
ment mechanism renders the 'gentlemen's agreement' negotiated under the aus-
pices of the OECD an enforceable agreement, if a competing State chooses to
initiate the process.")
230. Brazil-Aircraft Panel Report, supra note 201, para. 7.17.
231. Id. para. 7.20.
232. Id.
233. Brazil-Aircraft AB Report, supra note 206, para. 7.24.
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As in Schaffer's and Trachtmann's account, a logic of "proceduralism"
and authority delegation (to the OECD country members) does not add
to the delicateness of AB's political space. Additionally, Lang pointed
out the unlikeliness that this new approach by itself should offer a sub-
stantively neutral or non-intrusive form of regulatory review.2 34 This is
because states' regulatory freedom is already constrained by international
economic structures and, to a significant extent, is subject to the logics of
those structures.235 This seemed to be the case regarding the relationship
between Brazil's regulatory autonomy under item (k) of the Illustrative
List of annex I and the OECD Agreement for export credits. In this
sense, even the procedural review of Brazilian PROEX becomes intrusive
in its lack of commonly contracted international benchmarks and an un-
derlying understanding of economic differences between markets of cer-
tain products and between countries themselves.
2. Influence on Negotiations
The simple expression of "material advantages" in the ASCM adds to
the list of carefully designed WTO treaty language. As previously men-
tioned, it is not uncommon for ambiguity to be purposefully left to pro-
vide adaptation space to treaty interpreters and WTO Members. This is
also a simple link with the previous outlines of law-and-politics interac-
tion within the WTO system. Not only so, but it is important to note that
there is also yet another concomitant trend that emerges from this altered
institutional scenario. As many have suggested, deadlocked negotiations
and over-legalization have lead WTO Members to seek confirmation and
clarification of aspects of trade law not through rule negotiations, but
through dispute settlement system.
In this sense, the Brazil-Aircraft dispute has made some of the latent
differences between the developed/developing countries' market condi-
tions and market-oriented criteria obvious. Differences in creditworthi-
ness and in the amount to be paid for the loans are related to differences
in financial markets, which are well developed in OECD countries and
thus enabling OECD ECAs to provide cheaper financial instruments for
domestic exports.236 In response to this perceived imbalance through the
Brazil-Aircraft case, the Brazilian delegation, as well as developing coun-
tries, has shown increased sensitivity to this issue.
Brazil submitted its first document in 2002237 and complemented it
234. LANG, supra note 2, at 344.
235. Id.
236. Soprano, supra note 225, at 621.
237. Negotiating Group on Rules, Export Credits in the WTO, Paper by Brazil, 1, TN/
RL/W/5 (Apr. 26, 2002). See also Negotiating Group on Rules, Treatment of Gov-
ernment Support for Export Credits and Guarantees under the Agreement on Subsi-
dies and Countervailing Measures, Paper from Brazil, TN/RL/W/177 1 (Mar. 31,
2005). See generally Working Group on Trade, Debt and Finance, Communication
from Brazil, WT/WGTDF/W/39 (Oct. 6, 2008).
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with another paper circulated in 2005.238 The proposal was two-pronged.
Initially, it stated that items (j) and (k) are "clearly insufficient in... and
reflect outdated and unbalanced benchmarks. ' 239 As it pointed out, "the
word advantage involves the concept of comparison-advantage vis-A-vis
someone or something. ' '2 40 Following this interpretation, the benchmark
should be the export credit terms and conditions of potential competing
transactions and must include the country risk and the total subsidy pack-
ages available to competing firms.241
Thus, after Brazil-Aircraft, the Brazilian delegation brought the debate
to the diplomatic stage of the Doha Round of Negotiations. First, it pro-
posed changes in the area of export credit practices, emphasizing that a
cost-to-government approach to export credits represented an inherent
disadvantage for developing members whose costs of borrowing are
higher due to higher risk.2 42 Consequently, Brazil tried to demonstrate to
the Panel that the alleged subsidies payment merely "offset" the higher
cost of funding of Brazil in order to give purchasers of domestic exports,
export credit terms similar to those available for purchases from Brazilian
competitors in the "developed world."
The Draft Rules text proposed by the chairman provided a new first
paragraph for item (k). The proposed changes in the area of export credit
practices emphasized that a cost-to-government approach to export cred-
its represented an inherent disadvantage for developing members whose
costs of borrowing are higher due to higher risk.243
Second, as an attempt to clarify and to re-interpret matters scrutinized
during the dispute settlement proceedings, the Brazilian proposal also
touched upon matters of procedural fairness and sovereignty given the
substance of items (j) and (k) and the relationship of the ASCM (via item
(k)) to the Arrangement on Guidelines for Officially Supported Exported
Credits (Arrangement), whose participants are all members of the
OECD.244 With regard to the "evolutionary interpretation method
adopted by the DSBs," the proposal stated: [u]nder no circumstances,
however, should a small group of WTO Members be allowed to change
those rules through decisions taken in another forum. Any renunciation
of sovereignty by the Members of the WTO must be explicit and unam-
biguous, in accordance with customary rules of public international
law.
2 4 5
238. Negotiating Group on Rules, Treatment of Government Support for Export Credits
and Guarantees Under the Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures,
Paper from Brazil, 1, TN/RIJGEN/66 (Oct. 11, 2005).
239. Negotiating Group on Rules, Export Credits in the WTO, Paper by Brazil, 1, TN/
RUW/5 (Apr. 26, 2002).
240. Brazil-Aircraft Panel Report, supra note 201, paras. 4.80, 7.20.
241. Id. paras. 7.20-7.22.
242. Soprano, supra note 225, at 624.
243. Id.
244. Treatment of Government Support for Export Credits and Guarantees Under the
Agreement on Subsidies and Countervailing Measures, supra note 238, para. 3.
245. Id. para. 9.
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These two important aspects of the ASCM were initially raised in the
DSS of the WTO and subsequently transferred to the Rules Negotiations
in their capacity to contribute to agenda setting as well as offer detailed
legal explanations that are sometimes lacking amongst negotiators. 246
Thus, proposals of the sort began to arise during the Doha Development
Round.
Countries began proposing amendments to current WTO norms in or-
der to modify items () and (k) of the Illustrative List of annex I of the
ASCM and reduce the imbalances due to the financial and risk conditions
of developing countries against developed countries. 247 According to
Hufbauer, the Illustrative List of annex I was originally created as to
sharpen the lines between permissible and impermissible practices in the
export credit field. 2 48 The very manner in which those rules were written,
Hufbauer argues in Soprano's paper, creates an unbalanced playing field
between developing and developed countries. 249
As can already be seen from one of the initial cases in this new idea-
tional shift at the WTO, the difficulties in reaching the final Doha Agree-
ment underline a fundamental difference from previous trade rounds.
Fast-growing developing countries have become new key players in the
world trading system. The Brazil-Aircraft dispute demonstrates from
day one that technical terms in trade are up for re-interpretation and re-
definition in this new ideational shift and include a variety of players'
characteristic of the twentieth-first century.
B. US-COTTON
From 2003 to 2009, Brazil initiated an era of disputes that greatly im-
pacted on not only the manner in which export subsidies were understood
but also how this issue was reflected during the Doha negotiations. In
2002, Brazil-"a major cotton export competitor-expressed its growing
concerns about U.S. cotton subsidies. '250 Brazil initiated a WTO dispute
focusing on six specific claims relating to U.S. payment programs to cot-
ton producers.251 Brazil argued that the United States had failed to abide
by its commitments in the Uruguay Round Agreement on Agriculture
(AoA) and the ASCM.252 It was also within the Brazilian intention to
limit the initial implementation period of export subsidies, "the Peace
Clause," in article 13.253
246. Id. at 1.
247. Id. para 1.
248. Soprano, supra note 225, at 630.
249. Id.
250. RANDY SCIINEPF, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RS22187, BRAZIL'S WTO CASE
AGAINST THE U.S. CO-I'ON PROGRAM: A BRIEF OVERVIEW 1 (2009), available at
http://nationalaglawcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/assets/crs/RS22187.pdf.
251. Id.
252. Id. at 2.
253. Id.
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Five subsequent Cotton decisions clarified and interpreted the limits of
agricultural subsidies through the dispute settlement process of the
WTO.254 It was only in April 2010 that the two countries agreed upon a
path to negotiate a settlement,25 5 highlighting strengths and weakness of
the current DSS at the WTO. The Cotton disputes were important for
they constituted the first successful challenge to highly trade distorting
prohibited agricultural subsidies under the WTO. Not only so, they also
provided a useful example for the matter here in analysis regarding the
law-and-politics interaction within the WTO. Regarding the case in ques-
tion, increased policy space for the WTO's DSS has demanded institu-
tional answers for it.
In U.S.-Cotton, this analysis will proceed to examine the effects of the
Panel's and AB's delegation of authority to expert bodies as well as its
engagement in procedural review of a matter of great relevance to the
new powers and members within the WTO. Through these lenses and in
a very specific analysis, U.S.-Cotton will serve to demonstrate some of
the fallacies and uncertainties created by this institutional choice under-
taken by the WTO's "quasi-judicial" system. Instead of dueling on the
merits of the dispute, this section will restrain itself to exemplifying how
this successive tendency of "proceduralism" and delegation of authority
to scientific methods has not benefited the trading system with certainty
or predictability.
The U.S.-Cotton dispute involved many horizontally related regula-
tions such as the Agreement on Agriculture (AoA), and the FSC Repeal
and Extraterritorial Income Act of 2001 (ETI), as well as a series of evi-
dentiary items in the SCM Agreement such as serious prejudice determi-
nations, local content determinations, arbitration determinations, and the
expiration of the "peace clause. ' 256 What is relevant for the current anal-
ysis, however, are the U.S. export credit guarantee programs as they di-
rectly relate to the above-mentioned dispute and affect the manner in
which these matters were addressed by the DSBs and the consequent ef-
fects in rule negotiations.
1. Procedural Review
U.S. export credit programs constituted export subsidies under both
articles 8 and 10.1 of the Agreement of Agriculture and under the mean-
ing of item (j) of the Illustrative List of Exports Subsidies under articles
3.1 (a) and 3.2 of the ASCM. 257 In agreeing with the Panel, the AB was
254. Scott D. Andersen & Meredith A. Taylor, Brazil's Challenge to U.S. Cotton Subsi-
dies: The Road to Effective Disciplines in Agricultural Subsidies, Bus. LAW BPIEF
2 (2010), available at http://sistemas.mre.gov.br/kitweb/datafiles/IRBr/pt-br/file/
CAD/LX %20CAD/Direito/ALgodaoScottAndersen.pdf.
255. Press Release, U.S Trade Representative, U.S. Brazil Agree Upon Path toward
Negotiated Solution of Cotton Dispute (Apr. 2010).
256. Andersen & Taylor, supra note 254, at 2, 4-5.
257. See generally Appellate Body Report, U.S. Subsidies on Upland Cotton, WT/
DS267/AB/R (Mar. 3, 2005) [hereinafter U.S.-Cotton AB Report].
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satisfied that the two-fold link between these provisions had been ful-
filled, given that the ASCM was applicable to agricultural subsidies in the
lack of a specific provision on the AoA dealing with the same matter.258
Also, the AB reminded that the AoA should prevail over the ASCM
"only to the extent that the former contains an exception. '2 59 Thus, in
finding the applicability of the ASCM and the one in favor of Brazil
under this Agreement, the Panel determined that:
programs are provided by the U.S. at premium rates which are inad-
equate to cover long term operating costs and losses within the
meaning of item (j) of the Illustrative List of Export Subsidies in
Annex I of the SCM Agreement, and therefore constituted per se
export subsidies prohibited by Articles 3.1 (a) and 3.2 of the SCM
Agreement.2 60
Brazil's initial claim focused on a rather wide variety of U.S. subsidies
supporting the production and the export of cotton that caused "serious
prejudice" in the form of "significant price suppression," according to ar-
ticle 6.3 (c). 261 In analyzing U.S. subsidies' procedural way of implement-
ing this subsidy scheme, the Panel found that three of the price-
contingent subsidies-the marketing loan, the counter-cyclical payments,
and the domestic Step 2 subsidies-had collectively caused significant
price suppression in the world market and were, therefore, in breach of
the ASCM.262 The effect of the decision required the United States to
eliminate or otherwise make significant changes to the marketing loan
and counter-cyclical program legislation.2 63 This process-based review of
the U.S. subsidy scheme led to the eventual elimination of the U.S. Step 2
regulation program in 2006 but also avoided diving into the discussion of
what constituted a "serious prejudice determination" under those
terms.
264
This lack of evaluation in the Panel's decision soon was transferred to
the AB on appeal. As were its claims, the AB criticized the Compliance
Panel for not examining in detail the parameters of the competing eco-
nomic models presented by Brazil and the United States and for not go-
ing far enough in its comparative analysis of these models.2 65 It also
clarified that the effect of subsidies need not be the only cause of price
258. Id. para. 532 n.771. The Panel formulated examples but noted it was possible to
determine on a case-by-case basis. Panel Report, U.S. Subsidies on Upland Cot-
ton, paras. 7.1038-7.1039, WT/DS267/R (Sept. 8, 2004).
259. U.S.-Cotton AB Report, supra 257, para. 530.
260. Gehring, supra note 136, at 110.
261. Appellate Body Report, U.S.-Subsidies on Upland Cotton Recourse to Article 21.5
of the DSU by Brazil, para. 4, WT/DS267/AB/RW (June 2, 2008) [hereinafter ABR
Cotton 21.5].
262. Id.
263. Id. paras. 248, 447.
264. Id. paras. 8-10.
265. U.S.-Cotton AB Report, supra note 257, para. 458. The original AB had also
criticized the original panel for failing to provide a "more detailed explanation of
its analysis of the complex facts and economic arguments arising in this dispute."
Id.
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suppression. 266 This is a pragmatic acknowledgement that there are other
factors impacting the movement of prices and that a significant price sup-
pression claim may be maintained even if there are other factors influenc-
ing world prices.
Thus, yet another subjective concept was central to the dispute and in-
voked aspects of legal and economic judgments to secure its full under-
standing. As Shaffer and Trachtman explained, a delegation to experts
regarding factual analysis emerged as a new tendency under the DSB's
policy space.2 67 In this sense, where the ASCM called for the analysis of
whether the U.S. subsidy "cause" was to be interpreted as "significant
price suppression," the Panel relied on both economic and legal analy-
sis.268 Therefore, just as hard sciences provide tools to determine the sci-
entific basis for sanitary measures, economics does the same to analyze
price suppressions and the market effect of subsidies.
The AB endorsed the use of economic modelling and other quantita-
tive techniques to "provide a framework to analyse the relationship be-
tween subsidies, other factors, and price movements. '2 69 The AB's
decision criticized the Compliance Panel for not examining in detail the
parameters of the competing economic models presented by Brazil and
the United States and for not going far enough in its comparative analysis
of these models.270 Finally, the AB clarified that the effect of subsidies
need not be the only cause of price suppression.2 71
This was an important turn of the game, with the acceptance of the
arbitrator's calculations of what effectively "trade damages" were. The
arbitrator found the appropriate amount of concessions for Brazil was
limited on the impact on Brazil of the price suppression in the world mar-
ket resulting from the granting of a marketing loan and counter-cyclical
payments.272 This entailed a continued retaliation for Brazil until all
counter-cyclical subsidies are eliminated and all of their worldwide effects
removed.273 This acceptance of the arbitrator was also an acceptance of
economic models as useful evidentiary tools in conducting a necessary
analysis of subsidy effects. 274 The endorsement of such models repre-
sents a fairly unique use of this economic tool by the WTO decision-mak-
ers and foreshadows the import advisory role of the WTO Economics
Division as reviewers of the models in future cases.275
266. AB Report Cotton 21.5, supra note 251, para. 374.
267. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 170, at 135-40.
268. Id. at 138.
269. PETER VAN DEN Bosscir3 & WIRNERI ZDouc, Trm LAW AND POLICY OF 'PIE
WORLD TRADE ORGANIZATION 800 (2013).
270. AB Report Cotton 21.5, supra note 251, para. 358.
271. Id. para. 374.
272. Decision by the Arbitrator, United States-Subsidies on Upland Cotton: Recourse
to Arbitration by the United States under Article 22.6 of the DSU and Article 7.10 of
the SCM Agreement, 6.1-.5, para. 4.92, WT/DS267/ARB/2 (Aug. 31, 2009) [herein-
after Arbitrator's Report, Cotton 7.10].
273. Andersen & Taylor, supra note 254, at 4.
274. Id. at 4-5.
275. Id. at 5.
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The U.S.-Cotton proceedings demonstrate how document-intensive
and expert-intensive a task it is to quantify the effects of subsidies and
otherwise establish the causal link to serious prejudice in agricultural
commodity markets. In addition, the permitted arbitrator report pro-
vided precedents on several novel legal issues that are relevant to future
challenges to agricultural subsidies. As Schaffer and Trachtmann have
framed it, while such congruence may provide greater precision in the
application of these concepts and improve economic welfare, the use of
experts also could be viewed as enhancing overall political welfare if the
economic concepts are consistently applied without favoring some mem-
bers over others.276 The authors proceed to argue that the downside of a
DSS delegation to experts also relates to the fact that expertise is no
guarantee against bias or ideology, and affected stakeholders will be con-
cerned, in particular, if questions raising value judgments (such as eco-
nomic development policy) are being delegated to unaccountable
economic experts who help to justify in technocratic terms judicial deci-
sions with political implications. 2 77
The process-review and the delegation to specialist, once more, seem to
reach dubious results. It is not a matter of the results being consistently
biased towards a specific ideological or economic perspective. Rather, it
is a matter of a DSS that is able to provide consistency in its methods of
dispute resolution. It is important, therefore, to acknowledge the limits
of expertise in solving "real life cases" in markets that are defined
through contrasting characteristics. Whilst panels may use experts to jus-
tify their decisions from a technical and scientific perspective, their find-
ings are not sufficient to justify an institutional choice towards deference,
judicial balance or even process-review, thus contributing to the legiti-
macy challenges at stake in the WTO.
2. Influence on Negotiations
The wake of the U.S.-Cotton dispute greatly impacted negotiations re-
garding agricultural subsidies during the Doha Round.27 8 Not only so,
but the two avenues were mutually reinforcing in the case of U.S.-Cotton.
Throughout the almost complete decade of U.S.-Cotton negotiations, and
with the growing perception that the U.S. cotton subsidies would be ruled
inconsistent with the ASCM and AoA, the United States began re-think-
ing their negotiation position on the demands by the "Cotton 4" group. 279
Cotton producing countries in West Africa, Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad
and Mali had been trying to the get the United States to reduce their
cotton subsidies for almost a decade.2 80  With the outcome of
U.S.-Cotton, a United States change in negotitating position seemed in-
276. Shaffer & Trachtman, supra note 170, at 140.
277. Id.
278. Gehring, supra note 136, at 111-14.
279. See generally id.
280. Id. at 111.
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evitable. This can be seen through the analysis of the easy United States'
negotiating position in Cancun and the previous one in the 2004 July
Framework.
This influence was not merely one-sided. In lending moral support to
the Brazilian case, the African initiative showed that it was not only Bra-
zil that was adversely affected by the U.S. subsidies. Many Least Devel-
oping Countries were also in play. Concomitantly, Benin, Burkina Faso
and Mali submitted a proposal to the WTO to eliminate export subsidies
on cotton over three years, including a transnational compensation mech-
anism put forward at the Fifth Conference in Cancun, Mexico.281 It is
interesting to note how, after the U.S.-Cotton dispute, the group of G-20
enjoyed a position of prominence in cotton negotiations undermining the
ability of the former Quad (United States, EU, Japan and Canada) to
dominate negotiations. 282 In addition, with the advent of the Hong Kong
Ministerial Declaration, cotton negotiations were put back on the agenda
influenced by their recent attention in the international scenario.2 83 As
Gehring points out, this is interesting to the extent that, since the begin-
ning of agricultural negotiations, cotton only appeared as a separate ne-
gotiating item after the conclusion of the dispute at hand.2 84
Dominic Coppens' analysis is particularly helpful in understanding the
important interplay in subsidies' matters between dispute settlement and
negotiations.2 85 Negotiators seemed surprised by an increasingly flexible
jurisprudence instead of more rigid ones on export credit support for ag-
ricultural products at the Doha Round.2 86 Although the interaction be-
tween these two branches of the WTO is especially visible in this case, it
is nevertheless important to pay special attention to the way in which
these rules were articulated and what their effects might be. The differ-
ent treatment of WTO Members depending on whether they have sched-
uled products28 7 as well as the limited flexibility in terms of self-financing
periods may still be a disadvantage to developing countries. Thus, whilst
this approach does seem to provide more policy space allowing members
to recur to private market export credits, it is well known that private
trade financing instruments can quickly run dry in times of financial crisis.
Insofar as the reading of agricultural export credits follows the increas-
ingly more stringent provisions elaborated by members, these policy
changes have generally been welcomed. 288 It is imperative to note, how-
ever, that this objective "is only legitimate insofar as S&D treatment is
281. Id. at 111-12.
282. Id. at 112.
283. Id.
284. Id. at 112-13.
285. Dominic Coppens, WTO Disciplines on Export Credit Support for Agricultural
Products in the Wake of the US-Upland Cotton Case and the Doha Round Negotia-
tions 44 J. OF WOWi) TRADF 349, 382 (2010).
286. Id. at 349.
287. WTO Analytical Index, Agreement on Agriculture, 10.1(c)(iii)(116) (2014).
288. Coppens, supra note 285, at 384.
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not put upside down and rules are articulated coherently. '289 "An analy-
sis of future potential claims after the Cotton cases is appropriate, espe-
cially given the fact that such domestic subsidy regimes remain and
international condemnation of the negative impacts on the trade and de-




The Australia-Leather dispute, initiated in 1999 also had a long story of
permanence at the WTO. It "has been credited with legalizing the rela-
tionship between the WTO and its members," pointing to revealing
processes about the organization's direction.2 91 If not for the successive
Panel and AB Reports, this dispute would be valid for its impacts in rule
negotiations during the Doha Round. The dispute concerned assistance
provided by the government of Australia to Howe, a wholly-owned sub-
sidiary of Australian Leather Holdings (ALH). "Howe [was] the only
dedicated producer and exporter of automotive leather in Australia.
292
In 1997, the Australian Government agreed on a loan and a grant pack-
age to ALH and Howe due mid-2000, with facilitated payment conditions
and below market interest rates.293 This happened through various gov-
ernment programs, including the Import Credit Scheme and Export Facil-
itation Scheme. These schemes gained increased attention as American
competitors began losing market share to the Australian company. Ini-
tially, through a mutually agreeable settlement,2 94 parties to the dispute
agreed that Howe should "repay A$18 million to the Australian Govern-
ment" and that the government, in turn, should "immediately exclude au-
tomotive leather from the export schemes and to phase out the entire
programme by 2000."295
Soon after such settlement, suspicions arose as to whether further com-
pensation being paid to Howe from the Australian Government consti-
tuted a form of restructured subsidy. In light of this, the United States
requested fresh consultations in May 1998. The complaint rested on the
fact that the Australian grant and loan subsidies remained export-contin-
gent and in breach of the ASCM in article 3.1(a). The Panel found that
Australia was in breach of its SCM obligation only insofar as they re-
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290. Andersen & Taylor, supra note 254, at 5.
291. Natalie van der Waardeen,, Dispute Settlement in the WTO: The Automotive
Leather Dispute, 2001 AUSTL. INr'! LAW J. 244 (2001); see also S. Bruce Wilson,
Can the WTO Dispute Settlement Body be a Judicial Tribunal Rather Than a Diplo-
matic Club?, 31 LAw & POL'Y INT'L Bus. 779 (2000).
292. Panel Report, Australia-Subsidies Provided to Producers and Exporters of Auto-
motive Leather, para. 2.1, WT/DS126/R (May 25, 1999) [hereinafter
Australia-Leather].
293. Id. paras. 2.2-2.4.
294. Id. para. 3.1.
295. Bryan Mercurio, The Australian Contribution to the Jurisprudence of the WTO
Dispute Settlement Process, 43 INT'L TRADE LAW J. 12, 29 (2003).
2014]
250 LAW AND BUSINESS REVIEW OF THE AMERICAS [Vol. 20
ferred to the grant given to the Howe Company. That being the case, the
Panel requested Australia withdraw the subsidy without delay as required
under SCM article 4.7.296 Even so, "the government granted Howe a fur-
ther loan in the amount of $13.065 million on the day that repayment of
the grant was due to be paid."2 97 Finally, in article 21.5 of the Compli-
ance Panel, it was found that Australia had failed to sufficiently withdraw
the subsidy in its entirety. Australia was thus required to withdrawal all
of the subsidies conceded to Howe. This was the first time in WTO juris-
prudence that a "retroactive repayment of subsidies had ever been re-
quired under the [DSSJ. ' ' 2 9 8 Howe returned the payments to the
Australian Government over twelve years and the removal of automotive
leather was no longer eligible for support under government assistance
schemes.
1. Procedural Review
Under the new trend of the last ideational shift of the WTO, the new
trend triggered by the last ideological shift is an interesting dispute to
analyze. It exemplifies some of the insecurities that may arise from insti-
tutional choices made by Panels and ABs. Even after the full settlement
of the Australia-Leather dispute, uncertainty remains as to its lasting ef-
fects. This is because the Panel underwent a "mixed" procedure leading
to "mixed results. ' 299 In defining what constituted a prohibited subsidy,
the Panel formulated a two-step procedural review of countries' domestic
processes to determine whether their measures were contingent upon ex-
port performance. Initially, the Panel established that there must be a
"close connection" between the grant/subsidy and export performance;
and subsequently, the grant/subsidy must be "conditioned" on export. 3° °
To add to the confusion in these requirements, "the Panel failed to
clearly explain what it meant by the term 'conditional' and did not specify
whether, under Article 3.1(a), an export must be a necessary condition
for receiving the subsidy or whether it must be a sufficient condition for
receiving the subsidy."'30 Moreover, the difference between loans and
grants provided by the Australian Government seemed to provide little
guidance to differentiate between both requirements. 30 2 The dispute also
initiated a long and winding discussion about remedies available to con-
troversies over subsidy disputes. Given that article 4.7 does not envision
296. Australia-Leather, supra note 292, para. 10.7; Panel Report, Australia - Subsidies
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repayment of subsidies, the subsidy could be ended at any time without
fully restoring the status quo ante and depriving the recipient of the pro-
hibited subsidies in the first place.30 3
Due to this issue, yet another legally interesting answer was crafted.
"Article 21.5 Panel creatively sidestepped this dilemma by requiring, as a
condition of compliance," a retroactive subsidy repayment from Howe. 30 4
There are many issues associated with this Panel demand. First, it was a
very direct and controversial interference in a country's domestic policies.
Paradoxically, it has also served as a reminder of the strength of the WTO
DSS.305 In such a scenario, Australia-Leather created a fearful atmos-
phere given the strength of a "quasi-judicial" system to enforce such inva-
sive and, to a certain extent, unpredictable rules. Whilst intruding on
domestic sovereignty, this Panel recommendation directly affects mem-
bers' internal legal systems and procedures.
2. Influence on Negotiations
The decision of the Panel in Australia-Leather provoked emotional re-
sponses by WTO Members and concurrent Trade Rules Negotiations.
For one thing, it was seen as an irresponsible misinterpretation of WTO
law, which could lead to a watershed of retrospective payments that were
not in line with the purpose of the WTO. Second, the Panel's legal rea-
soning and systemic implications were found to be largely unsustainable
due to its implications for the countries involved.30 6 As Australia com-
mented at the time, the Panel's finding was so at odds with democratic
governance and economic reality that Australia could, in a theoretical
sense, find itself in an eternal stage of non-implementation. 30 7 As can be
seen in the minutes of the DSB meeting, this was a common concern
amongst most countries in analyzing this specific dispute, finding this dis-
pute as an "aberration" not to be followed.30 8
Regardless, it is crucial to clearly understand the consequences at-
tached to the Panel's procedural manner of deciding on the case. Its ap-
proach raised several concerns regarding the creation of further lack of
predictability and certainty to the trading system. Unsatisfactory review
and interference with members' domestic regulations also contributed to
that overall sentiment. At this point, the Panel's institutional choice
seemed to add substantive confusion to the role to be played by Doha
negotiators on the matter.
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The Panel's decision added complexity to negotiations in two main as-
pects. First, it cast more doubts on the legal standard for determining
whether a measure is contingent upon export performance. Second,
there was uncertain treatment of remedies available in disputes over sub-
sidy payments. At this point in time, it was clear that the finding that the
withdrawal of a subsidy under article 4.7 of the SCM Agreement, which
required retrospective repayment of past subsidies, challenged the notion
that the WTO had a role of redressing past injury.30 9 Renato Ruggiero,
the then-Director-General of the WTO, recognized that DSB operations
have been the subject of "skepticism" and formed "test(s) of credibil-
ity."'3 10 In this context, Rules Negotiations seemed to have a tough task
ahead in redressing the Panel's decision.
There is strong evidence to prove the agenda setting power that this
powerful dispute had on Doha Round Rules Negotiations. Whereas in
the cases above, the Panel and AB reports have been brought over to
Rules Negotiations with different purposes, in the case of Austra-
lia-Leather, Australia fiercely worked on a rules proposal to deny the
findings of the Panel and to avoid new dispute resolutions in this direc-
tion. Australia continuously acted in the Group of Rules Negotiation to
clarify and to deny the Panel's understanding in Australia-Leather. As it
stands, Australia has now worked in proposals in this sense for almost
five years. 31' During this period and as a pushing force for change, Aus-
tralia has been elaborating and re-elaborating proposals on addressing
the meaning and scope of what constitutes "withdrawal" of the subsidy as
provided under article 4.7 of the WTO Agreement on SCM. Australia's
attempts have been, in a sense, to clarify the text of SCM article 4 by
setting out the parameters of what is required in order to "withdraw,"
grant or maintain a subsidy. Australia has constantly intended to convey
that, depending on the facts and circumstances, the remedy of "with-
drawal" may need to address the ongoing benefit of a subsidy.
V. CONCLUDING REMARKS
In a joking comment, dated from 2006, Pascal Lamy, WTO Director
General, stated that the negotiations were "merely on a coffee break. '312
This paper has argued that a lot has happened during this "coffee break."
This article attempted to illustrate a novel cyclical logic in which WTO's
political and adjudicative groups have come to operate in during this pro-
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longed coffee break. It has attempted to demonstrate how the legal turn
towards "proceduralism" can be understood as an institutional response
to the difficulties faced in the latest multipolar round of trade negotia-
tions. This particular understanding of law has both contributed to and
been created in the context of this judicialization shift and stagnation of
negotiations. Thus, this process-based legal method feeds back into the
current cyclical dynamics of the workings of the WTO. By providing
negotiators with over technicalized and abstract legal methods upon
which to base their negotiations, it has created yet another challenge to
the conclusion of trade negotiations. Indeed, a very long "coffee break"
that needs to be further addressed by literature.
In conclusion, this thesis offers three cutting-edge insights into the le-
galization trend and "judicial shift" currently taking place at the WTO.
First, it understands that this "judicialization shift" need not be a negative
thing. In a quest for more political space and means to comprehend the
substantive choices of the trading regime, this institutional change may
indeed provide paths towards renovated social purposes of the organiza-
tion. Arguably, this paper understands that this new political space might
even be an option for approximating abstract trade rules to their substan-
tive effects. What is needed, however, is that the role of law and the turn
to "proceduralism" be thoroughly investigated. As Kennedy acutely puts
it, proceduralization of International Relations may be seen as a positive
development if not understood as an inevitable consequence of market
preferences, private institutions, and initiatives. 313 It is also for this rea-
son that trade professionals should be aware of current importance of the
DSS in international governance.
Second, despite recognizing that DSS activities are organically linked
to members' strategies in the Rules Negotiations Group and that this re-
lationship may facilitate advances in politically salient, sensitive and con-
troversial policy areas;314 this paper considers this alternative path to be
unsustainable to the maintenance and legitimacy of the trading system.
What is needed, therefore, is that such institutional choices look beneath
the blanket insistence on technical transparency and on the unrealistic
sanitary way in which they appear to deal with disputes.315 In this sense,
the choice for "proceduralism" and institutional oriented methods of law
are in and of themselves political choices undertaken by the WTO and its
DSS. As suggested in Part III, the adherence to legal process values is by
no means an "apolitical choice." Instead, it is an anticipated social and
political choice insofar as such legal methodology leads to specific appli-
cations and outcomes. Hence, the focus on the legal processes under-
taken by the DSS is the second contribution of this thesis to the relevant
literature. In this account, it has argued that the processes and workings
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of trade professionals are the mainspring of substantive consensus in
trade matters. This focus on processes is intended to verify how a new
ideational shift is being formed within the organization and what its con-
crete and systemic effects are.
Third, this thesis has suggested that the robust body of panel reports to
guide DSS decision-making is currently floating on a political vacuum.
By itself, legalization is not a distributive economic or developmental
strategy. It is simply a manifestation of "global law and governance with-
out global politics. ' 316 In this sense, the legal regime simply offers an
arena to contest economic and social choices; it is not a substitute for
them. 317 The case analyses have attempted to show the emptiness and
the lack of foreseeability brought by the approaches taken by the DSS in
the crucial area of subsidy law. Whilst it is true that economic systems do
not exist without legal instruments, legalization cannot be used as a
"flight from economic analysis and political choice. ' 318 In this sense, this
thesis claims that these decisions are part of constraining processes that
contribute to rule making at the WTO legislative bodies.
Processes are a significant part of international governance and should
call for more choices between finance and production, capital and labor,
and consumers and producers. For that, it is necessary to understand this
turn as an opportunity to justify its methods and have them linked with
their substantive and systemic outcomes. Procedural interpretation of
WTO law, as here presented, has not only failed to provide a consistent
response to the worries of members and their respective societies, but has
also cast a shadow on the original intent of ambiguous and gap-filled
treaty language. It is no news that this characteristic was inherent to
GAT 1947 and that it was workable in the diplomatic settings of those
circumstances. Decades of legalization and technicalization have
changed the purpose and the consequences of constructive ambiguities in
treaty language. With legalization, these well-known characteristics of
treaties have been transformed into a dueling arena of technical expertise
and not of open political negotiation.
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